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EMPLOYMENT AS FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP 
 





Under traditional agency law doctrine, employees are agents of their 
employers and owe an agent’s concomitant fiduciary duties.  Employers, 
in turn, are merely principals and have no corresponding fiduciary duties.  
A new wave of thinking has unsettled this approach by concluding that 
only high-level employees have fiduciary responsibilities to their 
employers.  Taking this controversy as a starting point, this Article 
reconceives the employment relationship as a mutual fiduciary 
relationship in which both employers and employees are fiduciaries of 
one another.  Even though current law does not consider employers to be 
fiduciaries of their employees, employers have long had significant 
statutory and common-law responsibilities toward their employees that 
reflect a fiduciary character.  Looking to these responsibilities as well as 
research on the theory of the firm, the Article argues that employers are 
fiduciaries and must refrain from opportunism, especially when 
employees have no voice in governance.  However, in an organizational 
setting where employees do participate in governing the firm, it would be 
appropriate to recalibrate the reciprocal fiduciary duties to require a 
balanced set of obligations between all parties. 
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 Are employees fiduciaries of their employers?  The question seems 
largely settled.  The hoary “master-servant” doctrine holds that employees 
are agents of their employers and owe traditional fiduciary duties.1  
                                                          
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 
7.07(3)(a) (2006). 
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However, this blanket coverage of all employees has increasingly 
disturbed labor and employment law academics, who have pointed out 
that the fiduciary duties within the relationship seem fairly one-sided.2   
Indeed, it seems jarring to juxtapose an agent’s selfless duties of loyalty 
and performance with an employer’s minimal obligations under 
employment at-will.3  After all, fiduciary duties are traditionally called into 
being to protect the vulnerable against depredations from those with 
power over them.  The resulting critique has left the existence as well as 
the strength of employee fiduciary duties open to question.  The recent 
Restatement of Employment Law only applies the traditional fiduciary 
duty of loyalty to employees “in a position of trust and confidence.”4  Other 
employees have only a limited duty of loyalty with respect to trade secrets 
or a contractual duty of loyalty.5  As the Restatement commentary 
describes: “As a general matter, the duty of loyalty stated in this Section 
has little practical application to the employer's ‘rank-and-file’ employees . . 
. .”6 
 The debate over employee fiduciary duties is just the tip of a larger 
set of unresolved issues that make up the complicated fiduciary 
relationship between employees and employers.  In a similar way, the 
                                                          
2 See Ken Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and “Un-American” Labor Law, 82 
N.C. L. REV. 1705, 1726 (2004) (“Such duties are unidirectional: workers are required to be 
loyal to their employers, but employers owe no reciprocal duty of loyalty.”). 
3 See, e.g., Catherine Fisk & Adam Barry, Contingent Loyalty and Restricted Exit: 
Commentary on the Restatement of Employment Law, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 413, 
419 (2012) (“The employer owes no duty of loyalty to the employee and is free to pursue 
its self-interest by firing him to hire another for a lower wage or for better skills. Yet the 
employee's ability to pursue her own self-interest by seeking better opportunities is 
limited.”); Michael Selmi, The Restatement's Supersized Duty of Loyalty Provision, 16 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 395, 402-03 (2012) (noting that “some, though not many, courts to 
hold that at-will employees owe no duty [of loyalty] to their employer, while many other 
courts impose only a limited duty of loyalty on at-will employees, for to do otherwise 
would go beyond what the parties presumably bargained for”). 
4 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01(a) (2015). 
5 Id. (“Other employees who come into possession of the employer's trade secrets owe a 
limited fiduciary duty of loyalty with regard to those trade secrets. In addition, employees 
may, depending on the nature of the employment position, owe an implied contractual 
duty of loyalty to the employer in matters related to their employment.”). 
6 Id. § 8.01 cmt. a. 
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traditional “master-servant” doctrine7 provides an obsolete and facile legal 
label for a much richer and entangled set of legal relations.  The legal 
obligations between employer and employee do not, in fact, run all one 
way; the employees’ duty of loyalty is but one facet of a multi-faceted set 
of obligations and responsibilities.  Recognized in the context of this more 
nuanced relationship, employee fiduciary duties become less threatening 
and more understandable.  But they do not stand alone.  The employer 
itself has myriad fiduciary and quasi-fiduciary responsibilities to 
employees that have not been recognized as such or have not been given 
their appropriate weight.  Employees and employers have multiple and 
interwoven fiduciary responsibilities to each other and amongst 
themselves that structure the employment relationship.  As a result, it is 
appropriate to say that employers are fiduciaries, too. 
 This Article will explore the complexities of the fiduciary 
relationship between employees and employers.  It will support the 
traditional approach that employees owe fiduciary duties to their 
employers.  However, it will also argue that employers owe fiduciary or 
quasi-fiduciary duties—some through fiduciary common law, many 
through statute—to their employees.  We have seen the progression of 
these responsibilities grow over time: minimum wages, overtime, pension 
benefits, time for parental and medical leave, and most recently health 
insurance mandates.  Although these duties are often categorized as 
regulatory,8 they are in fact better characterized as organizational and 
relational duties: duties that derive from the employer-employee 
relationship itself.  The relationship between an employer and its 
employees is best seen not as an adjunct of the principal-agent 
relationship, but rather as a new and more appropriate organizational 
designation.   
                                                          
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958) (referring to the employer as “master” and 
the employee as “servant”). 
8 See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Labor Law Reform Again? Reframing Labor Law as a 
Regulatory Project, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 383, 385 (2013) (arguing that labor law 
should be reframed “as part of the larger societal project of regulating work and working 
conditions”). 
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Critical to this new approach is the understanding that employees 
participate in the economic enterprise of the employer.9  They are not 
passive inputs, but rather part and parcel of the employer as an 
independent economic entity.  Employment is a meaningful legal category 
because employees fall within the boundaries of the firm and are, in 
important ways, the firm itself.  As such, they are responsible for and are 
the responsibility of the employer.  The mutual relationship between the 
entity that acts as the legal employer and the employees that have been 
hired by that entity is what generates the duties between employer and 
employee—and thus, in an important way, between one employee and her 
fellow employees.   
 Part I of the Article explores the traditional fiduciary duties 
between employer and employee as set forth by the common law of 
agency and employment law.   Part II examines the employment 
relationship from the perspective of the theory of the firm.   
 Part III sets forth the manifold common law and statutory duties that 
employers owe to employees, including what could be regarded as 
traditional fiduciary duties.  Part IV discusses prior theories of employer 
fiduciary duties and introduces a new approach based on fiduciary theory 
and the theory of the firm.  Finally, Part V looks at how the role of 
employees in the governance of the firm should shape the fiduciary duties 
that employers and employees owe. 
 
 
I.  EMPLOYEES AS AGENTS 
 
Under the traditional common law, employees have been defined as 
a subspecies of agent whose actions were particularly aligned with the 
principal.  The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines servants as “an 
agent employed by a master to perform service in his affairs whose 
physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is 
                                                          
9 See Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
661, 705 (2013) (discussing employment as participation). 
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subject to the right to control by the master.”10  The so-called “control” test 
is the dominant standard for employment, both nationally and 
internationally.   The basics of the control test are straightforward.  A 
servant is one who is “under the duty of rendering personal services to the 
master or to others on behalf of the master.”11  In addition, the master 
must have the “right to control the servant’s work,” which means “being 
entitled to tell the servant when to work (within the hours of service) and 
when not to work, and what work to do and how to do it.”12  This right of 
control is what separates master-servant from the principal-agent. 
 To a great extent, this traditional definition still holds in the law.  
The Supreme Court has made the common-law “control” test into the 
default definition for “employee” whenever used without further 
explanation in a federal statute.13 The Fair Labor Standards Act and the 
Family and Medical Leave Act define “employ” as “suffer or permit to 
work,”14  and the Supreme Court has recognized that the FLSA definition 
may extend to cover workers beyond the reach of the common law agency 
test.15 Outside of these statutory contexts, however, the Supreme Court has 
made it clear that the “control” test is to apply as the default rule.  That is 
not to say, of course, that the control test is easy or straightforward to 
apply.  The Restatement (Second) of Agency provides a ten-factor 
balancing test for determining whether the potential master/employer is 
                                                          
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (1958); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (2006) (defining an employee as “an agent whose principal controls 
or has the right to control the manner and means of the agent's performance of work”). 
11 FRANCIS R. BATT, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 6 (1929), quoted in Ronald H. Coase, 
The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 403-04(1937). 
12 Coase, supra note RC1, at 404. 
13See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1989) (“In the 
past, when Congress has used the term ‘employee’ without defining it, we have concluded 
that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as 
understood by common-law agency doctrine.”). 
14 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2012) (FLSA); 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (2012) (FMLA) (referencing FLSA 
definitions). 
15 See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (noting that the FLSA 
“stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such 
under a strict application of traditional agency law principles”).  
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exercising control.16  As the Restatement commentary acknowledges, this 
employment relationship is “one not capable of exact definition.”17   
 Because agency law has taken the lead in defining the legal 
meaning of “employee,” and because agency law has always treated 
employees as a subcategory of agent,18 employees have been naturally 
assumed to be agents.  As agents, employees have traditionally owed the 
same fiduciary duties that agents owe to their principals.19  These duties 
can be roughly categorized into two types: duties of loyalty and duties of 
performance.20  The duty of loyalty is perhaps the more prominent; it 
requires the agent to “act solely for the benefit of the principal in all 
matters connected with his agency.”21  Nested within this overall duty are 
the duties to not take business opportunities from the principal,22 to not 
deal with the principal on behalf of an adverse third party,23 to not 
compete with the principal during the agency relationship,24 to not use the 
principal’s property for the agent’s own purposes, and to not disclose the 
principal’s confidential information.25  As to duties of performance, the 
agent has the duty to exercise reasonable care, competence, and 
                                                          
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958) (including such factors as “whether 
or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business,” “the skill 
required in the particular occupation,” and “whether or not the work is a part of the 
regular business of the employer”). 
17 Id. § 220 cmt. c. 
18 Id. § 2 cmt. a (“A master is a species of principal, and a servant is a species of agent.”). 
19 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958) (characterizing agency as a fiduciary 
relation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (same). 
20 See id. §§ 8.02-8.12.  See also Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049, 
1049 (2007) (“Within common law agency, an agent owes the principal fiduciary duties of 
loyalty as well as duties of performance.”). 
21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 
8.01 (2006) (stating that the agent has “a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s 
benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship”).  See also Benjamin Aaron, 
Employees' Duty of Loyalty: Introduction and Overview, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 143, 
144 (1999) (stating that the duty of loyalty in general "require[s] the employee [to] behave 
during the period of employment so as to enhance, rather than harm or hinder, the 
business interests of the employer"). 
22 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 (2006). 
23 Id. § 8.03. 
24 Id. § 8.04. 
25 Id. § 8.05. 
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diligence,26 to follow instructions,27 to act reasonably and refrain from 
damaging conduct,28 to provide information,29 and to segregate the 
principal’s property.30  In contrast, the principal only has limited duties to 
the agent.  Outside of contractual duties,31 the principal has a limited duty 
to indemnify the agent32 as well as a duty to provide information regarding 
potential for physical harm or pecuniary loss.33 
 As a matter of doctrine, it seems hard to argue with the agency 
account of employment.  If an agent is one who acts on behalf of a 
principal and is subject to the principal’s control, then employees are 
agents-plus, or mega-agents—a special category of agents that are 
particularly tied to the principal.  While many agency relationships are 
temporary and task-oriented, employment is seen as a wider-ranging and 
longer-lasting version wherein the employee is given greater discretion to 
act on behalf of the principal.34  Moreover, the employee shares the 
characteristics of the agent that have called forth a specific body of agency 
law—namely, that the agent is given particularized power to act on behalf 
of the principal.35  Because the agent has discretion to act on behalf of the 
principal, the principal is vulnerable to the agent’s use of this power.36  
Similarly, employees acting on behalf of the interests of another entity 
                                                          
26 Id. § 8.08. 
27 Id. § 8.09. 
28 Id. § 8.10. 
29 Id. § 8.11. 
30 Id. § 8.12. 
31 See id. § 8.13. 
32 Id. § 8.14. 
33 Id. § 8.15.  The Restatement (Third) frames this duty as part of the overall duty of good 
faith and fair dealing. 
34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958) (“The word ‘servant’ is used in contrast 
with ‘independent contractor’. The latter term includes all persons who contract to do 
something for another but who are not servants in doing the work undertaken.”). 
35 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. c (2006) (“As defined by the common law, 
the concept of agency posits a consensual relationship in which one person, to one degree 
or another or respect or another, acts as a representative of or otherwise acts on behalf of 
another person with power to affect the legal rights and duties of the other person.”). 
36 Id. (“The common-law definition requires that an agent hold power, a concept that 
encompasses authority but is broader in scope and connotation.”). 
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(the employer) are agents and should be bound by the same set of 
fiduciary duties, including the duty of loyalty. 
 Two sets of critiques could be leveled against this status-based 
approach to employee-as-agent: one related to agency more generally, and 
one related to employment specifically.  First, there is a generalized 
critique of fiduciary law that is based on the status of the parties at issue.  
Because of the immense variability within recognized categories of 
fiduciaries, many academics have argued that status-based fiduciary 
relationships are inherently suspect.37 To provide one prominent example, 
Paul Finn contended that “it is meaningless to talk of fiduciary 
relationships as such.  Once one looks at the rules and principles which 
actually have been evolved, it quickly becomes apparent that it is pointless 
to describe a person . . . as being a fiduciary.”38  Given the wide variety of 
agency relationships, it could be argued that agents are too diffuse and 
variegated a category to ascribe as fiduciary in nature per se.  However, 
there is a “general consensus” that agency is presumptively fiduciary in 
nature, based on the authority and discretion that the agent has to act on 
behalf of the principal and bind the principal.39  The very definition of 
agent is one who acts on behalf of another. 
 The second, more specific critique of the employment-agency 
paradigm calls into question the application of the agent’s traditional 
fiduciary duties to the employment relationship.  An agent’s fiduciary 
duties, although somewhat vaguely defined, are fairly extensive.  In 
particular, agents have the duty of loyalty to the principal—the duty to 
“act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his 
agency.”40  This self-abnegation is a critical aspect of the agency 
                                                          
37 Paul B. Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
FIDUCIARY LAW 63, 65 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014). (“The dominant 
academic view is that the fiduciary relationship is indefinable. . . . Judges treat the 
fiduciary relationship as conceptually central to fiduciary liability; leading academics 
deny the coherence of the concept.”). 
38 PAUL D. FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 1 (1977). 
39 Miller, supra note PMFR, at 79. 
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958).  See also Aaron, supra note BA1, at 
144 (stating that the duty of loyalty in general “require[s] the employee [to] behave during 
the period of employment so as to enhance, rather than harm or hinder, the business 
interests of the employer”). 
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relationship, as it balances out the agent’s power to step into the shoes of 
the principal and act on the principal’s behalf.  But many scholars have 
criticized the duty as unfairly one-sided in the employment context.  The 
at-will presumption allows employers to fire employees (and employees to 
quit) at any time and for a variety of reasons having nothing to do with 
performance.41  In comparison, under fiduciary law only one of the two 
parties must be “loyal” to the other; the employer has no fiduciary duties 
with respect to the employee.  The duty of loyalty seems particularly 
onerous when framed in terms of the “faithless servant.”  According to this 
doctrine, an employee who violates the duty of loyalty must disgorge the 
entirety of her wages for the period of disloyalty.42  These doctrines work to 
disempower the employee.43 The employee can be let go at any time and 
for a variety of reasons, but the employee must always act in the interest of 
the employer.44   Although at-will employment and the employee’s duty of 
                                                          
41 See Selmi, supra note MS1, at 397 (“The beauty of the employment at-will relationship, 
it is often said, is its reciprocity: neither employees nor employers are bound to continue 
the relationship.”). 
42 Charles A. Sullivan, Mastering the Faithless Servant?: Reconciling Employment Law, 
Contract Law, and Fiduciary Duty, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 777 (“The quaintly named ‘faithless 
servant’ doctrine requires employees subject to it not merely to pay damages for their 
derelictions, but also to disgorge the compensation paid during the period of faithlessness 
without any right to recover in quantum meruit for the value the employee may have 
provided during that time.”). 
43 In addition, the origins of “master-servant” doctrine came at a time when employer 
obligations were generally to a term of employment, rather than at-will.  See Matthew W. 
Finkin, An Employee's Right Not to Obey Orders in the United States, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL'Y J. 497, 497 (2010) (“Under the common law of master and servant that governed the 
employment relationship in the United States from the Federal period until the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, non-casual labor was commonly contracted for a fixed 
duration or was held to be for a fixed term as determined by the usage of the trade or, 
later, by the periodicity of payment.”).  The employer thus had duties to the employee 
regarding grounds for termination and even the scope of the employee’s duties to obey 
the employer.  Id. (“An employee discharged for refusal to obey what he believed to be an 
unlawful or unreasonable order could sue for breach of contract, it being a question for a 
jury whether the order disobeyed was lawful and reasonable, although the standard of 
unreasonableness sufficient to justify disobedience was rather high . . . .”). 
44 Fisk & Barry, supra note F&B1, at 418-19 (“The employer owes no duty of loyalty to the 
employee and is free to pursue its self-interest by firing him to hire another for a lower 
wage or for better skills. Yet the employee's ability to pursue her own self-interest by 
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loyalty are not necessarily contradictory, they point up a larger problem of 
employee vulnerability.  If fiduciary law is meant to protect the 
vulnerable, as is often stated, then why does it protect employers and not 
employees?  Even if an employee might hold discretionary legal power in 
her hands, is there any doubt about who holds the real power in the 
relationship? 
 Broadly speaking, there are three potential approaches to these 
concerns about employee fiduciary duties.  The first approach would be to 
argue for the creation/recognition of greater fiduciary and quasi-fiduciary 
responsibilities from employers to employees in order to balance out the 
disparity.  As will be discussed below, the United States has actually 
followed this approach much more extensively than commentators have 
appreciated.45  However, employer duties have been imposed almost 
entirely by statute; as a matter of fiduciary law, courts have not made 
employers into fiduciaries and for the most part have not imposed 
significant common law fiduciary duties on them.  A second approach 
would be to remove employees from the category of “agents” with respect 
to agency law.  From a doctrinal perspective, that approach seems 
unsustainable: employees by definition act on behalf of their employers 
and are subject to the employer’s right to control their work as 
employees.46  However, some commentators have argued that rank-and-
file employees do not genuinely have the power and discretion generally 
attributed to agents, and that such low-level workers should not be 
                                                                                                                                                              
seeking better opportunities is limited. The employer can cast him or her onto the labor 
market whenever it is in the employer's interest to do so, yet the employee is burdened 
with an expansive duty of loyalty and can be contractually burdened with a non-compete 
agreement, making it hard for the employee to find alternate employment when he or 
she is back in the labor market.”). 
45 See Part III infra. 
46 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. g (2006) (“As agents, all employees owe 
duties of loyalty to their employers. The specific implications vary with the position the 
employee occupies, the nature of the employer's assets to which the employee has access, 
and the degree of discretion that the employee's work requires. However ministerial or 
routinized a work assignment may be, no agent, whether or not an employee, is simply a 
pair of hands, legs, or eyes.”). 
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considered agents or fiduciaries.47  A number of jurisdictions have found 
that employees are not subject to particular fiduciary duties, and at least 
some have based this reasoning on the absence of a fiduciary 
relationship.48 
 The third and most traditional approach to the imbalance between 
employer and employee fiduciary duties is to acknowledge the existence of 
employee fiduciary duties but to modify, weaken, or diminish their 
content.  The duty of loyalty, for example, has been held to apply only to 
employee competition with the employer while the employee is still 
working there.49  The loyalty duty becomes essentially an implied 
covenant not to compete while one is still an employee.  The 
contemporary version of the duty has been described as “well defined”: 
namely, that “employees can prepare to compete with their current 
employer, but they must not solicit business and, in some circumstances, 
                                                          
47 Fisk & Barry, supra note F&B1, at 429 (“Not all employment relationships are fiduciary.  
Most low-level employment relationships are strictly contractual, in the sense that the 
employer has not put the employee in a position to affect its legal relations with third 
parties and need not trust the employee to exercise discretion on the employer’s behalf in 
order to get the benefit of the contractual relationship.”); Aline van Bever, When is an 
Employee a Fiduciary?, 18 CANADIAN LAB. & EMP. L.J. 39, 42 (2014) (arguing that “it is not 
the existence of an employment relationship as such, but the concrete circumstances of 
the particular relationship, that put an employee in a fiduciary position”). 
48 See Selmi, supra note MS1, at 397 (finding that “many, though not all, courts have seen 
fit to treat the employment relationship as a principal-agent relationship”); TalentBurst, 
Inc. v. Collabera, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 261, 266 (D. Mass. 2008) (examining Massachusetts 
law to conclude that conclude that “the duty of loyalty does not extend to ‘rank-and-file’ 
employees under Massachusetts law, absent special circumstances indicating they held a 
position of ‘trust and confidence’”); Dalton v. Camp, 548 S.E.2d 704, 708 (N.C. 2001) 
(holding that the circumstances regarding the employment relationship in question were 
akin to “virtually all employer-employee relationships” and were therefore “inadequate to 
establish [the employee’s] obligations as fiduciary in nature”).  For a critique of the Dalton 
decision, see Bret L. Grebe, Fidelity at the Workplace: The Two-Faced Nature of the Duty 
of Loyalty under Dalton v. Camp, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1815, 1815-16 (2002) (“Though relying 
on a traditional definition of the fiduciary relationship, the court applied that definition 
narrowly and in derogation to common law agency principles.”). 
49 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.04(a) (2015) (restricting competition by current 
employees); id. § 8.05 (allowing former employee to compete in the absence of a covenant 
not to compete or trade secrets). 
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employees prior to leaving their employment.”50  The exact parameters are 
a source of contention, particularly with respect to the extent to which 
employees may work together to prepare for their exit.51  But such a 
“narrowly circumscribed” duty does not appear particularly objectionable 
to courts or particularly threatening to employee advocates.52  Moreover, it 
appears to fit well within existing agency doctrine, which recognizes that 
the duty of loyalty varies “with the position the employee occupies, the 
nature of the employer's assets to which the employee has access, and the 
degree of discretion that the employee's work requires.”53 
 However, there has also been a trend toward the elimination of the 
duty of loyalty for the average, rank-and-file employee.54  The new 
Restatement of Employment Law provides: “Employees in a position of 
trust and confidence with their employer owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to 
the employer in matters related to their employment.”55  Other employees 
                                                          
50 Selmi, supra note MS1, at 397.  See also id. (finding a “clear consensus that sees the duty 
serving a distinct but limited function relating to employees who leave for a competitor 
or to start a competing business”). 
51 Many courts allow employees to plan their “escape” as long as they do not actively 
solicit clients for the new venture and do not use their time or the employer’s property in 
furtherance of the new venture.  See, e.g., Augat, Inc. v. Aegis, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 415, 419-20 
(Mass. 1991) (“An at-will employee may properly plan to go into competition with his 
employer and may take active steps to do so while still employed.  Such an employee has 
no general duty to disclose his plans to the employer, and generally he may secretly join 
other employees in the endeavor without violating any duty to his employer . . . .”); 
Illumination Station, Inc. v. Cook, No. 07-3007, 2007 WL 1624458, at *4 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 
20, 2007) (refusing to dismiss a breach-of-loyalty claim against a sales representative who, 
while employed, diverted customer orders to a rival company); Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. 
Glen, 411 P.2d 921, 939 (Cal. 1966) (en banc) (holding that a corporation's president 
breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty by recruiting subordinates for a competitor prior to 
his departure); Eckard Brandes, Inc. v. Riley, 338 F.3d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 2003) (duty of 
loyalty violated when employee ran a competing pipe-repair business establishment while 
still employed by employer). 
52 Selmi, supra note MS1, at 403. 
53 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. g (2006). 
54 Leslie Larkin Cooney, Employee Fiduciary Duties: One Size Does Not Fit All, 79 MISS. 
L.J. 853, 853-54 (2010) (contending that “applying the same agency principles to all 
employees regardless of their level of power or ability to exercise discretion or affect the 
employer's interests generates an uncalled for advantage to the employer”). 
55 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01(a) (2015). 
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may owe a “implied contractual duty of loyalty” based on the nature of 
their position, such as having access to certain accounts or critical 
information.56  The agency relationship itself is insufficient, in the eyes of 
the Employment Law Restatement, to create a duty of loyalty per se.57  
Those employees with a “relationship of trust and confidence” are further 
defined as “(1) employees who exercise substantial discretion and are not 
subject to close supervision in carrying out their managerial, supervisory, 
professional, or similar highly skilled work responsibilities and (2) the 
employees who are entrusted with or come into possession of the 
employer's trade secrets.”58  The commentary makes clear that 
“[e]mployees falling outside either category do not owe a fiduciary duty of 
loyalty to their employer but may nevertheless owe an implied contractual 
duty of loyalty . . . .”59 
 Given the controversy over the duty of loyalty, it is perhaps not 
surprising that employees’ duties of performance have largely been 
ignored.  The Restatement of Employment Law does not mention any such 
duties, and actions by employers against employees on performance 
grounds are largely nonexistent.60  Although directors and officers owe 
their corporations a duty of care, these duties exist above and apart from 
                                                          
56 Id. at cmt. b & illus. 3. 
57 Id. at cmt. b (“Courts often point to the agency relationship between the employer and 
employee as the source of the duty of loyalty. But as the decisions make clear, labels from 
agency law or elsewhere are no substitute for a fact-sensitive analysis of whether the 
employee in question either occupies a position of trust and confidence sufficient to 
trigger the fiduciary duty of loyalty, assumes a fiduciary duty for a limited time when 
coming into possession of the employer's trade secrets, or is subject only to an implied 
contractual duty of loyalty arising from the nature or circumstances of the 
employment.”). 
An earlier version of the section provided more generally that “[e]mployees owe a 
duty of loyalty to their employer in matters related to the employment relationship.” 
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01(a) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2011). 
58 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01(a) cmt. a (2015). 
59 Id.  
60 Such cases generally only arise in the context of corporate directors and officers, and 
even then are generally weak.  See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben & Alana Darnell, Delaware's 
Duty of Care, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 589 (2006) (“In short, the classic duty of care no longer 
exists in Delaware.”). 
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the normal agency duties of performance.61  The Restatement (Third) of 
Agency cites to employee cases with regard to the agent’s duty of good 
conduct.62  However, these cases all provide employers with justification 
for terminating an employee without notice in violation of a contractual 
provision.63  Such justifications are not necessary in the at-will context. 
 Employee fiduciary duties, while seemingly straightforward as a 
matter of agency doctrine, are rather more complicated as a matter of 
practice.  Courts and critics have questioned the existence of the agency 
relationship within the employment relationship as well as the existence 
and robustness of the duty of loyalty within that relationship.  The policy 
concerns that justify this disengagement of employment from agency law 
largely revolve around the power imbalance between employer and 
employee.  Employee fiduciary responsibilities seem unbalanced when 
employers do not have any fiduciary responsibilities of their own. 
 The doctrine behind employment as a fiduciary relationship is 
unsettled because the doctrine is unmoored from the nature of the 
relationship.  Employees are not simply a type of agent; they have a 
unique relationship with the employer and their fellow employees.  This 
relationship is best categorized as not as simply an agency relationship, but 
                                                          
61 The Restatement (Third) of Agency illustrates the agent’s duty to comply with lawful 
instructions with reference to a loan officer’s disregard of the bank’s lending limits.  The 
Reporter’s Notes cite to Omnibank of Mantee v. United S. Bank, 607 So. 2d 76 (Miss. 1992), 
which specifically reference an officer’s duties, rather than an agent’s.  Id. at 84 (“By law, 
officer Gray owed USB two principal duties: a duty of care and a duty of loyalty and fair 
dealing. These duties differ in nature and content, though they doubtless intersect and 
overlap. The law demands these duties of bank officers the same as officers of other 
corporations . . . .”).  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09, Reporter’s Notes to cmt. 
c (2006). 
62 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.10 cmt. b & illus. 2-4 (2006). 
63 See McGarry v. St. Anthony of Padua Roman Catholic Church, 704 A.2d 1353 
(N.J.Super.App.Div.1998) (holding that misconduct of an employee justified termination 
without thirty-days notice); Griep v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 120 F.Supp.2d 1196, 1201 
(D.Minn.2000) (misconduct justified termination without contractually-required notice 
prior to discharge because employee breached “an implied contractual obligation … to 
observe rudimentary principles of appropriate behavior”); Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 
952 F.Supp. 1458 (D.Colo.1997) (upholding employer’s discharge of employee for letter 
critical of employer's customer service for publication in newspaper, despite Colorado’s 
off-duty conduct law, because of employee’s disloyalty). 
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rather as an organizational relationship in which the parties have 
overlapping fiduciary duties to one another.  To better understand this 
relationship, we begin with the economic theory of the firm, and the role 
of employees within that economic concept. 
 
 
II. EMPLOYEES WITHIN THE FIRM  
 
 To understand the nature of the employment relationship, we must 
move beyond its origins in master-and-servant law.  The “master-servant” 
model imagines two separate and individual parties and their relationship 
with one another.  Particularly under pre-industrial English common law, 
the master was an individual who ordered his servant or servants in a 
direct, person-to-person relationship.64  In our modern economy, however, 
the employer is generally not a person but instead a business organization.  
This organization is a fictional “person” that represents the relationships 
between a handful, dozens, hundreds, or thousands of parties.  These 
relationships between individuals for the purpose of carrying on a joint 
economic enterprise are known in economics as a firm.65 
 The law conceives of a firm as a legal entity formed through state 
organizational law, such as a partnership, corporation, or LLC.66  However, 
these entities represent only the legal relationships between the fictional 
legal entity and those who have ownership rights in the entity.  To take the 
                                                          
64 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 410 (1765) (“If an innkeeper’s servants rob his 
guests, the master is bound to restitution; for as there is a confidence reposed in him, that 
he will take care to provide honest servants, his negligence is a kind of implied consent to 
the robbery.”). 
65 See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 783 (1972) (defining a classical firm as a 
“contractual organization of inputs” in which there is “(a) joint production, (a) joint input 
production, (b) several input owners, (c) one party who is common to all the contracts of 
the joint inputs, (d) who has rights to renegotiate any input's contract independently of 
contracts with other input owners, (e) who holds the residual claim, and (f) who has the 
right to sell his central contractual residual status”). 
66 Cf. ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS:  A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 2 (2013) (describing a 
legal theory of the firm); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 21 (2013) 
(discussing the move “from the economic concept of the firm to the legal concept of the 
business association”). 
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most common organizational example—the corporation—the law 
organizes the governance structure around equity investors and ignores 
the relationship between corporation and employee.  But as explained 
below, the corporation as economic firm is made up not only of directors, 
officers, and shareholders, but also of employees.    
Employees have been central to our conception of the firm from the 
start.  In early neoclassical economics, the theory of firm was quite 
rudimentary; it simply saw the firm as a black box which took in inputs 
and produced outputs.67  Employees and capital assets were inside the 
black box, while customers and suppliers were outside.68   
When Ronald Coase revolutionized economic thinking about the 
firm, he focused on employees.69  Coase contrasted firms with markets by 
noting that outside of the firm, “price movements direct production,” while 
within firms, markets are replaced by the entrepreneur-co-ordinator.70  The 
reason for this replacement was that the price mechanism can be costly.71  
In order to avoid the transaction costs of contracting, certain transactions 
will be more efficiently conducted within a firm rather than on an open 
market.72  The firm-based transactions described by Coase involve the 
purchase of labor for a particular endeavor.  In explaining these 
transactions, Coase stated: “If a workman moves from department Y to 
department X, he does not go because of a change in relative prices, but 
because he is ordered to do so.”73  
 The relationship between the entrepreneur-coordinator and the 
employee is, in fact, the primary distinction between the firm and the 
market.  When Coase considered “whether the concept of a firm which has 
been developed fits in with that existing in the real world,”74 his answer was 
that “[w]e can best approach the question of what constitutes a firm in 
                                                          
67 Charles R.T. O'Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the Theory of the Modern Corporation, 31 
J. CORP. L. 753, 757 (2006). 
68 Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and 
the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1631 (2001). 
69 Coase, supra note RC1. 
70 Id. at 388 (footnote omitted). 
71 Id. at 390–92. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 387. 
74 Id. at 403. 
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practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that of 
‘master and servant’ or ‘employer and employee.’”75  Discussing the 
common law “control” test at length, Coase cited to its provision that “‘[t]he 
master must have the right to control the servant’s work, either personally 
or by another servant or agent.’”76  Coase concluded: “We thus see that it is 
the fact of direction which is the essence of the legal concept of ‘employer 
and employee,’ just as it was in the economic concept which was developed 
above.”77 
In an important response to Coase’s work, Armen Alchian and 
Harold Demsetz agreed that the employment relation is central to the 
concept of the firm.78  However, they argued that Coase’s focus on control, 
authority, and direction was misleading, particularly within an at-will 
relationship.79  Instead, they argued that the importance of the firm (as 
separate from the market) stems from the need to coordinate production 
in the midst of a variety of inputs—the need for a system of “team 
production.”80  Alchian and Demsetz defined team production as 
“production in which 1) several types of resources are used and 2) the 
product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating resource.”81  
                                                          
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 404 (quoting BATT, supra note FB1, at 6). 
77 Id. 
78 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note AD1, at 777 (“When a lumber mill employs a 
cabinetmaker, cooperation between specialists is achieved within a firm, and when a 
cabinetmaker purchases wood from a lumberman, the cooperation takes place across 
markets (or between firms).”). 
79 Id. (“To speak of managing, directing, or assigning workers to various tasks is a 
deceptive way of noting that the employer continually is involved in renegotiation of 
contracts on terms that must be acceptable to both parties.”).  As they put it: 
Telling an employee to type this letter rather than to file that document 
is like my telling a grocer to sell me this brand of tuna rather than that 
brand of bread.  I have no contract to continue to purchase from the 
grocer and neither the employer nor the employee is bound by any 
contractual obligations to continue their relationship.  Long-term 
contracts between employer and employee are not the essence of the 
organization we call a firm. 
Id. 
80 Id. at 777–78. 
81 Id. at 779. 
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The inability to measure individual contributions to productivity is what 
makes the firm an efficient alternative to markets, but it is also the firm’s 
central governance problem.  Alchian and Demsetz argued that a 
specialized, independent monitor may be the best way of insuring that the 
team members all contribute appropriately and are rewarded 
appropriately.82  That central monitor—the recipient of the residual 
profits—would be the firm.83   
Transaction costs, monitoring costs, and team production have 
remained central concepts within theory-of-the-firm literature.  The 
transaction-costs model identified the types of contractual difficulties 
which are likely to lead to firm governance, rather than market solutions.84  
In situations where contributions and compensation can be harder to 
define, the parties will be left with incomplete contracts that require a 
governance structure to prevent opportunism.  This opportunism will be 
particularly problematic where one or both of the parties must invest 
significant resources in assets specific to the particular firm, project, or 
transaction.  This asset specificity makes the parties susceptible to hold-ups 
                                                          
82 Id. at 782–83. 
83 Alchian and Demsetz seemed to believe that the firm will be represented by a central 
figure who has claim to the entire residual, and thus an interest in coordinating the firm 
most efficiently.  But they said nothing about who can appoint such a central figure, and 
they express skepticism about the ability of shareholders to perform the monitoring 
function.  Rather than characterize shareholders as owners, they argued that shareholders 
should be viewed merely as investors, like bondholders, albeit “more optimistic” ones.  
They asked: 
In sum, is it the case that the stockholder-investor relationship is one emanating 
from the division of ownership among several people, or is it that the collection 
of investment funds from people of varying anticipations is the underlying 
factor?  If the latter, why should any of them be thought of as the owners in 
whom voting rights, whatever they may signify or however exercisable, should 
reside in order to enhance efficiency?  Why voting rights in any of the outside, 
participating investors? 
Id. 
84 Jeffrey T. Macher & Barak D. Richman, Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of 
Empirical Research in the Social Sciences, 10 BUS. & POL. 1 (2008) (discussing the 
transaction costs approach). 
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from their contractual partners in the absence of a system of governance.  
Firms can be useful in providing the structures that deter opportunism.85   
In the transaction costs model, employees’ contributions must be 
recognized as assets of both the firm and the employee—often described as 
“human capital.”86  Some types of human capital are transferable, such as 
education or general skills, but other types are specific to the firm and 
generally worthless outside it.  To the extent an employee has invested in 
firm-specific skills, she is subject to opportunistic behavior, since she has 
little leverage to get the full value of those skills.  In the transaction-cost 
model, employees may be precisely the vulnerable yet valuable 
contributors to the joint enterprise who are most vulnerable to 
opportunistic behavior.87 
The focus on assets has carried over into the “property rights” 
theory of the firm, which posits that the firm should be owned by those 
who contribute the most valuable and most asset-specific property to the 
joint enterprise.88   This theory posits that firms are necessary as a 
repository of property rights for assets used in joint production.  By owning 
the property outright, the firm prevents the problem of the commons (in 
which no one holds property rights over valuable assets) as well as the 
problem of the anticommons (in which property rights are divvied up 
amongst too many disparate actors).  The property-rights model dictates 
that the firm should be owned by those who contribute the most valuable 
                                                          
85 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 114-15 (1985); 
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 47–48 (1996). 
86 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 
J. CORP. L. 657, 663 n.26 (1996) (discussing the need for asset specificity at to the firm, and 
highlighting firm-specific human capital, under Williamson’s transaction cost theory). 
87 Indeed, Margaret Blair offers the following critique: “The tendency in the transactions 
cost literature has been to recognize that firm-specific human capital raises similar 
questions, but then to sidestep the implications of these questions for corporate 
governance.”  Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm, 
in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 58, 66 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 
2000). 
88 See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995); Sanford J. 
Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical 
and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, 
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988); Oliver Hart & 
John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990). 
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and most asset-specific property to the joint enterprise.  They are not only 
most necessary to the firm’s success; they are also the most vulnerable to 
hold-up problems as the joint enterprise moves forward in time.  Although 
the property rights discussed in the model are generally nonhuman assets, 
the assets are “the glue that keeps the firm together” and thus keep 
employees within the firm.89   
Along these lines, the “access” model of power within the firm 
defines a firm “both in terms of unique assets (which may be physical or 
human) and in terms of the people who have access to these assets.”90  
Access to the unique assets is what defines the power of the individuals 
within and outside of the firm.  Access is defined as “the ability to use, or 
work with, a critical resource.”91  Examples of critical resources include 
machines, ideas, and people.92  Access gives the employee the ability “to 
create a critical resource that she controls: her specialized human 
capital.”93  Control over this critical resource is a source of power.94  Given 
the importance of access, the role of the firm is to allocate access 
efficiently amongst the firm’s agents.95 
                                                          
89 HART, supra note OH1, at 57.  Hart posed the following hypothetical: if firm 1 acquires 
firm 2, what is to stop workers at former firm 2 from quitting and forming a new entity? 
Hart’s answer: “there must be some source of firm 2 value over and above the workers’ 
human capital, i.e. some ‘glue’ holding firm 2’s workers in place.”  Id.  This source of firm 
2’s value could be “a place to meet; the firm’s name, reputation, or distribution network; 
the firm’s files, containing important information about its operations or its customers; or 
a contract that prohibits firm 2’s workers from working for competitors or from taking 
existing clients with them when they quit.”  But there needed to be something, for 
“without something holding the firm together, the firm is just a phantom.”  Id. (footnotes 
omitted). 
90 Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON. 387, 
390 (1998).  
91 Id. at 388. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Rajan and Zingales argue that “[s]ince the amount of surplus that she gets from this 
power is often more contingent on her making the right specific investment than the 
surplus that comes from ownership, access can be a better mechanism to provide 
incentives than ownership.”  Id. 
95 Id. at 391. 
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Recent scholarship has taken the role of human capital even 
further.  One aspect of this capital—knowledge—has served as the basis for 
a new set of approaches to the firm.96  Knowledge is defined both as 
explicit sets of formal information as well as the ability to apply a 
repository of unspecified information in developing an answer or approach 
to a particular problem.97  Rather than emphasize the ownership of 
physical assets, which can be fungible and nonspecific, the knowledge-
based theory focuses on the need to produce, distribute, and ultimately 
retain valuable knowledge-based assets within the firm.98  Knowledge-
based theories of the firm provide an intersection for the economic, 
organizational, and sociological theories as to the nature of the firm.99  In 
                                                          
96 See generally Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal 
Institutions, and Firm Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 
NW. U. L. REV. 1123 (2007) (arguing that an organization’s structure is dependent on the 
type of knowledge it requires); Sarah Kaplan et al., Knowledge-Based Theories of the 
Firm: A Review and Extension, (Mass. Inst. Tech. Sloan Working Paper No. 4216-01, 2001) 
(introducing a view of the firm that is knowledge-based), available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.8.8829&rep=rep1&type=pdf; 
Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human 
Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721 (2002) (discussing legal 
conceptions that govern the ownership of human capital within the workplace). 
97 For a discussion of explicit versus tacit knowledge, see Ikujiro Nonaka et al., A Theory 
of Organizational Knowledge Creation: Understanding the Dynamic Process of Creating 
Knowledge, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING & KNOWLEDGE 491, 494 (Meinolf 
Dierkes et al. eds., 2001).  Gorga and Halberstam classify knowledge into three types: 
“knowledge embedded in physical assets,” “knowledge embedded in the organizational 
structure or the group of individuals that constitute the firm[,]” and “specialized 
knowledge embedded in the individual.”  Gorga & Halberstam, supra note GH1, at 1141–
42.  As they explain, “[t]he way a firm develops the knowledge it will use in its production 
process and the extent that the firm can bind this knowledge to its structure will 
influence its organizational structure.”  Id. at 1140 
98 Id. at 1137 (criticizing the property rights theory for failing to account for the 
importance of employees as assets).  Along the same lines, a capability-based theory of the 
firm has focused on firm-specific knowledge and learning that can be translated into joint 
production.  Thomas McInerney, Implications of High Performance Production and Work 
Practices for Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
135, 137–38. 
99 See, e.g., Rajan & Zingales, supra note RZ1, at 424–25 (arguing that there is “ample 
opportunity for gains from trade” between economics and sociology, as sociologists have 
studied the role of power within organizations “in some detail”); D. Gordon Smith & 
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fact, one set of scholars has examined the role of the firm as a 
“collaborative community” in which employees work together toward 
common goals.100 
As these theories of the firm make clear, employees are part of the 
firm in ways that other stakeholders such as suppliers, customers, and 
lenders are not.  If the firm is defined as an organization devoted to a 
continuing economic enterprise, then employees and equity holders are 
within the firm, and the other stakeholders are outside.  This fits within 
our common conception of what a “firm” is: a company “is” its executives, 
its employees, and its shareholders, while it is not its lenders, suppliers, and 
customers.  Indeed, this is the purpose of drawing the line between 
employees and independent contractors.  Employees are part of the firm in 
ways that independent contractors are not; they are participants in the 
common economic enterprise of the firm.101  So employees have 
continuing duties to the employer, the employer has continuing duties to 
employees, and the employer is responsible for the actions of employees 
taken within the scope of employment.   
A firm-oriented approach to the employment relationship explains 
why employers actually have a portfolio of legal responsibilities to their 
employees and on behalf of their employees.  Employers are not simply 
helpless principals that depend on their employees to carry out their 
actions.  They are instead legal entities with power over the joint 
production of the business enterprise carried on by equity and labor.  As 
such, it is natural that the law assigns them responsibilities to and on 
behalf of their employees. 
 
 
III. EMPLOYER DUTIES RELATING TO EMPLOYEES 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 1 (2009) (comparing 
organizational theories to the traditional legal and economic theories of contract and 
firm). 
100 See Paul S. Adler & Charles Heckscher, Towards Collaborative Community, in THE 
FIRM AS COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY 11, 20 (Charles Heckscher & Paul S. Adler eds., 2006). 
101 Bodie, supra note MTB1. 
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 The fiduciary relationship between employee and employer looks 
unbalanced from the perspective of agency law: the employee as agent 
owes duties to the employer, but the employer owes no such duties to the 
employee.  But employers under current law owe myriad duties to their 
employees and on behalf of their employees, not only under the common 
law but also under statutory and regulatory law.  These duties are explored 
below. 
 
A. Employer Duties to Employees 
 
 As discussed earlier, employers owe only minor fiduciary duties in 
their role as principals: the limited duty to indemnify the agent102 as well 
as a duty to provide information regarding potential for physical harm or 
pecuniary loss.103  However, the common law has long placed particular 
duties on employers in their role as employers.  Since the Progressive Era 
and the New Deal, employer duties have increased exponentially through 
a blossoming of federal and state statutory schemes.  Below is a brief 
overview of these duties, categorized by subject matter. 
 
1. Duties of workplace safety 
 Employers have duties to protect employees within the workplace 
from a variety of sources.  First, employers are liability for the torts of their 
employees—not only when the victims are third parties, but also when the 
victims are fellow employees.  When one employee harms another as a 
result of tortious behavior, the employer is liable if that tort was 
committed within the employee’s scope of employment or if the employer 
later ratifies the conduct.104  The Restatement of Employment Law also 
provides for employer liability if a supervisor or manager commits a tort 
outside the scope of employment, unless the employer took reasonable 
care to prevent the conduct and the employee failed to take advantage of 
this care.105  This latter extension of respondeat superior tracks the 
                                                          
102 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.14 (2006). 
103 Id. § 8.15.  The Restatement (Third) frames this duty as part of the overall duty of good 
faith and fair dealing. 
104 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.03(a) & (b) (2015). 
105 Id. § 4.03(c).  
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Supreme Court’s defense against vicarious liability under Title VII for 
sexual harassment.106  Indeed, federal antidiscrimination statutes can be 
likened to torts,107 and an employer also has responsibility for a hostile 
work environment when that environment was created by a supervisor or 
supervisors with authority over the employee.108  Employers also have a 
common law duty to exercise care in selecting, retaining, and supervising 
its employees,109  and they are liable for harm to employees caused by their 
failure to exercise reasonable care in these responsibilities.110   
 Employers also have a common-law duty to provide a reasonably 
safe workplace for employees and to provide warning of dangerous 
working conditions.111  This duty dates back to master-servant law, whereby 
“[a] master is subject to a duty that care be used either to provide working 
conditions which are reasonably safe for his servants and subservants . . . or 
to warn them of risks of unsafe conditions . . . that they may not 
discover.”112  However, modern interpretation has held that the provision of 
a warning does not obviate the need to provide a reasonably safe 
                                                          
106 Id. § 4.03 cmt. g.   
107 Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1052 (2014) (“Courts and 
commentators often label federal discrimination statutes as torts.”). 
108 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998).  
A similar duty has been found in tort.  See, e.g.,  Ford v. Revlon, Inc. 734 P.2d 580, 584-85 
(Ariz. 1987) (holding that a company's failure to investigate a complaint of sexually 
abusive treatment is independent of the abusive treatment itself and that a company may 
be liable for failing to stop the abusive treatment regardless of whether the treatment 
itself rises to the level of an actionable tort). 
109 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.04 (2015). 
110 See, e.g., Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 575 N.E.2d 428, 432 (Ohio 1991) (“[A]n employer 
may be liable for failing to take appropriate action where that employer knows or has 
reason to know that one of its employees poses an unreasonable risk of harm to other 
employees.”); Retherford v. AT & T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 
949, 973 (Utah 1992) (describing the elements of a claim of negligent employment as “(i) 
[employer] knew or should have known that its employees posed a foreseeable risk of 
retaliatory harassment to third parties, including fellow employees; (ii) the employees did 
indeed inflict such harm; and (iii) the employer's negligence in hiring, supervising, or 
retaining the employees proximately caused the injury”). 
111 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.05 (2015).  The duty has been recognized in all 
U.S. jurisdictions.  See id. at Reporters’ Notes for cmt. a.   
112 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 492 (1958). 
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workplace.113  The common-law duty has been supplemented and 
expanded by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA),114 
under which employers similarly have a general duty to provide safe 
working conditions.115  In addition to this general duty, OSHA provides for 
a complex regulatory framework as established through promulgated 
occupational safety and health standards.116  
  
2. Duties of workplace privacy 
The common law of torts provides for protections against privacy 
invasions such as intrusions into private locations or the public disclosure 
of private facts.117  These protections apply within the workplace as well.  
Even though the employer generally provides the physical locations and 
electronic resources that employees use for their work, employees can 
develop expectations of privacy in these locations and resources.118  An 
employer can thus be liable to an employee for, as examples, opening an 
employee’s locker119 or reading an employee’s email,120 even when the 
locker and email are provided by the employer.  Employers also assume a 
duty to prevent third parties, including certain other employees, from 
accessing employee confidential information.121  The Restatement of 
Employment Law considers employee information to be confidential if 
“the employer has promised, by words or conduct, to keep the information 
confidential or if the employer is required by law to treat the information 
as confidential.”122  In some contexts, employers may be considered to be 
                                                          
113 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.05 cmt. g (2015).   
114 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2012). 
115 See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2012) (requiring employers to “furnish to each of his 
employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized 
hazards”). 
116 Id. § 654(a)(2). 
117 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652D (1965). 
118 RESTATEMENT  OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.03 (2015).  
119 See, e.g., K-Mart Corp. Store 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App. 1984) (providing 
that employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in workplace locker). 
120 Restuccia v. Burk Tech., 1996 WL 1329386 (Mass. Super. Ct.) (denying summary 
judgment against invasion-of-privacy claim based on search of employer-provided e-mail 
account). 
121 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.05 (2015). 
122 Id. § 7.05 cmt. b. 
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information fiduciaries with respect to health data or other personal 
information that the employer has collected through the employment 
relationship.123 
 
3. Duties regarding wage or income compensation 
 Under federal law, employers must provide a minimum wage to all 
employees.124  The same statute provides that employees must receive one-
and-a-half times their hourly wages if they work over forty hours per 
week.125  These federal requirements are supplemented by state and local 
minimum wage laws, many of which go well above the federal 
minimums.126  Employers also have duties as to when and how often they 
must pay their employees.  Along with employer wage payment duties 
under the common law,127 federal and state statutes require timely wage 
                                                          
123 Employers do not currently have specific federal statutory duties of confidentiality.  
See Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules and the 
Common Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 617, 634 (2002) (arguing that a federal obligation is 
necessary to “address the threat to health care confidentiality created by employer access 
to protected health information”).  Employer-sponsored plans do have certain limits on 
disclosure to the employer.  See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.504(f) & 164.512(b)(v) (2001); Winn, 
supra, at 670 (“Under the [HIPAA] Rules, health plans maintained by employers are 
covered entities with similar duties to protect the confidentiality of personal health 
information.”).  However, federal regulations have been used to create a common-law 
duty of confidentiality.  See Ilene N. Moore et. al., Confidentiality and Privacy in Health 
Care from the Patient's Perspective: Does Hipaa Help?, 17 HEALTH MATRIX 215, 231 (2007) 
(“Because HIPAA places an affirmative duty on employers to properly train their 
employees, employees' failure to comply may lend support to plaintiffs' invasion of 
privacy or breach of confidentiality claims against employers.”).  For a theory of employer 
fiduciary duties in the context of health insurance, see Margaux J. Hall, A Fiduciary 
Theory of Health Entitlements, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1729, 1737 (2014). 
124 See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012). 
125 See 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2012). 
126 See Irene Lurie, Enforcement of State Minimum Wage and Overtime Laws: Resources, 
Procedures, and Outcomes, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 411, 436 (2011) (providing a table 
of state minimum wage and overtime laws as of 2010). 
127 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 3.01-3.05 (2015); see, e.g., id. § 3.01(b) (“Whether 
compensation has been earned is determined by the agreement on compensation between 
the employer and employee or any relevant binding promise or binding policy statement 
on compensation made by the employer.”). 
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payments and divisible portions.128  These mandatory rules displace 
contractual arrangements upon which the parties might otherwise have 
settled.129   
 
4. Duties regarding benefits 
 Apart from wage and income compensation, employers have 
generally not been required to provide certain benefits to employees as 
part of employment.  One exception is the unpaid leave required under the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).130  Employers must provide their 
employees with up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave a year for family or 
medical leave and allow the employee to return to an equivalent 
position.131  The Obama Administration has expanded paid medical leave 
for federal employees132 and has proposed paid sick leave for all U.S. 
workers.133 
                                                          
128 In the 19th Century, employers would often hire employees for a term but then only 
pay them at the end of the term, and only if the employee completed the term.  No 
recovery for partial performance was permitted under contract, and employees were left 
with a quantum meruit claim that was only intermittently successful.   See, e.g., Stark v. 
Parker, 2 Pick. 267, 293 (Mass. 1824) (denying recovery under quantum meruit); Britton v. 
Turner, 6 N.H. 481, 482-83 (1834) (permitting recovery under quantum meruit).  Modern 
wage payment schemes require that employees be paid regularly and that they be paid 
for all time worked, regardless of the length of term.  See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
LAW §§ 3.01 cmt. b (2015) (“Many states have wage-payment laws that determine the 
mode and frequency of payment.”).  
129 In some countries, a smaller set of minimum wage protections have been extended to 
“dependent contractors” who work separately from the buyer but are dependent on the 
buyer (and the buyer’s industry) for their livelihoods. See Brian A. Langille & Guy 
Davidov, Beyond Employees and Independent Contractors: A View from Canada, 21 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 7, 22–29 (1999) (discussing dependent contractors in Canadian 
law). 
130 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2012). 
131 Id. § 2612(a)(1). 
132 Presidential Memorandum, Modernizing Federal Leave Policies for Childbirth, 
Adoption and Foster Care to Recruit and Retain Talent and Improve Productivity, Jan. 15, 
2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/15/presidential-memorandum-
modernizing-federal-leave-policies-childbirth-ad.   
133 See Healthy Families Act, H.R. 1286, 113th Cong., March 20, 2013, 
http://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/1286 (requiring employers to 
permit each employee to earn at least 1 hour of paid sick time for every 30 hours worked).  
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As to other employee benefits, the law has mostly not imposed 
duties to provide certain benefits, but rather has required employers to 
provide them in a certain way, if they are provided at all.  The Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)134 does not require that 
employers provide pension or welfare benefits.135  However, it does provide 
mandatory standards for these benefits if they are provided, particularly in 
the pension context.  The Supreme Court has interpreted ERISA to borrow 
principles from the law of trusts with respect to fiduciary obligations.136  
Specifically, the administrator of an ERISA plan has the same 
responsibilities as a trustee when it comes to administering the plan.137  
This means that the officials must abide by their fiduciary responsibilities 
when making decisions on behalf of the beneficiaries.138  The statutory 
scheme provides for four primary fiduciary duties: the duty of loyalty to 
plan participants,139 the duty of prudence,140 the duty of prudent 
diversification of plan assets,141 and the duty to follow plan terms.142  In 
addition, there are specific requirements about the operation of the plan.  
Pension benefits must vest after a period of time, meaning that they 
cannot be taken away by employer fiat.143  If the employer provides 
                                                          
134 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 
U.S.C.). 
135 Conkright v. Frommert, 559 U.S. 506, 516 (2010) (“Congress enacted ERISA to ensure 
that employees would receive the benefits they had earned, but Congress did not require 
employers to establish benefit plans in the first place.”). 
136 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989)(“ERISA's legislative 
history confirms that the Act's fiduciary responsibility provisions codify and make 
applicable to ERISA fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of 
trusts.” (citations and quotations omitted)). 
137 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 111 (2008) (stating that courts “should 
analogize a plan administrator to the trustee of a common-law trust” and “should consider 
a benefit determination to be a fiduciary act”). 
138 Plan administrators need not follow the duty of loyalty when making decisions as a 
trust settlor, as opposed to a trust administrator.   
139 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2012) (also known as the exclusive benefit rule). 
140 Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B). 
141 Id. § 1104(a)(1)(C). 
142 Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D). 
143 See, e.g., id.  § 1053 (providing for minimum vesting standards for employee 
retirement accounts). 
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benefits through a defined benefit plan, the plan must be funded 
appropriately as defined through a complicated series of requirements.144  
If the employer provides benefits through a defined contribution plan, it 
still owes the employee-beneficiaries duties of loyalty and following 
instructions.145  The upside of this complicated regulatory scheme is a set 
of tax savings for both employer and employee.  However, this tax savings 
is only available if the employer offers the benefits to a sufficiently broad 
number of employees.146  This nondiscrimination principle prevents the 
employer from segregating off benefits only for the fortunate few. 147  
 Until recently, health insurance plans were regulated primarily by 
state law, with ERISA provide only framework protections.148  However, the 
Affordable Care Act created a new set of incentives and requirements for 
employers with respect to such insurance.  The employer mandate 
requires employers of a certain size to purchase health insurance for their 
employees or provide funding for employees to buy their insurance on 
                                                          
144 See 29 U.S.C. §§1081-1086 (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 412 (2012). 
145 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (providing an exemption for the duties of prudence and 
diversification); LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 256 (2008) 
(“We therefore hold that although [ERISA] § 502(a)(2), [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2)] . . . does 
authorize recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a 
participant's individual account.”).  See also Fifth Third Bancorp. v. Dudenhoffer, 134 S. Ct. 
2459 (2014) (discussing fiduciary duties of ESOP trustees). 
146 ERISA’s so-called “nondiscrimination” requirements endeavor to achieve the “social 
policy goal of ensuring that the employer’s rank and file employees benefit from the 
employer’s qualified plan.”  COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 
LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 164 (4th ed. 2015).  Such requirements include minimum 
coverage requirements, 26 U.S.C. § 410(b), and the prohibition against discrimination in 
favor of highly compensated employees, 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(4).  For further discussion, see 
MEDILL, supra, at 163-204. 
147 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 410(b)(1)(A) (requiring that the plan benefit at least seventy 
percent of employees who are not highly compensated employees).  But see Bruce Wolk, 
Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Intentions Confront 
Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV. 419, 420 (1984) (arguing that “despite its apparent 
egalitarianism, [ERISA] is ill-suited to achieve Congress' goal of wide-spread pension 
coverage for lower paid employees”). 
148 Amy B. Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free Market? An Examination of 
Mandated Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1361, 1363-74. 
 
EMPLOYMENT AS FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP                          31 
 
 
state exchanges.149  If employers fail to do so, they must pay a tax penalty.  
Some commentators have predicted that the high cost of insurance will 
lead employers to stop providing health benefits and instead pay the tax.150  
However, to this point, it does not appear that most employers have 
dropped coverage in light of the ACA mandate.151 
 Employers are also responsible for workplace injuries that require 
medical treatment and may result in employee disability.  Although such 
responsibilities were handled through tort law up until the early 20th 
Century, employers are now responsible for employee injuries through 
workers’ compensation laws.152  The workers’ compensation model 
represents a bargain between employer and employees, struck by state 
legislatures: employees are covered for all workplace injuries without 
having to prove employer fault, and employers are only liable for statutory 
damages based on medical care and degree of disability.153  Employers 
generally manage this responsibility through insurance.154 
                                                          
149 The employer mandate is developed in 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2012).  For a brief overview 
of the employer mandate, see Suja A. Thomas & Peter Molk, Employer Costs and 
Conflicts Under the Affordable Care Act, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 56, 58-59 (2013). 
150 Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by 
Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 127 (2011) (“[C]ommentators have 
generally focused on the prospect that employers will choose to drop health coverage 
entirely when ACA's core reforms are implemented in 2014.”). 
151 See Don McCanne, Impact of ACA on employers and their employees, PHNP BLOG, 
May 15, 2015, http://pnhp.org/blog/2015/05/15/impact-of-aca-on-employers-and-their-
employees/ (“Ninety-four percent of all surveyed organizations continue to provide health 
care coverage for all full-time employees in 2015 and, among that group, nearly all plan 
to continue coverage in 2016.” (citing study by International Foundation of Employee 
Benefit Plans, http://pnhp.org/blog/2015/05/15/impact-of-aca-on-employers-and-their-
employees/)). 
152 Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial 
Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 53-59 (1967) (tracing the evolution of workers' 
compensation insurance in the United States). 
153 Shauhin Talesh, Insurance Law As Public Interest Law, 2 UC IRVINE L. REV. 985, 1001 
(2012) (“[T]he workers' compensation system emerged from a desire to create a new, 
workable, and predictable mode of handling accident liability that balanced the interests 
of labor and management.”).  Workers’ comp systems are largely described as strict 
liability.  There are exclusions in some states based on employee fault.  MARC A. 
FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 828, 834-35, 866-69 (8th ed. 2006) 
 




5. Duties regarding discipline and termination 
 The “employment at will” doctrine frames that relationship as 
terminable at any time, with or without cause.155  Protections within that 
relationship are largely contractual.156 However, the common law of tort 
does render an employer liable for wrongful discharges in violation of 
public policy.157  The employer has a duty not to fire an employee because 
the employee refused to violate the law in the course of employment,158 or 
because the employee abided by professional codes of ethics or conduct.159  
The protections also extend to employees who report on employer 
wrongdoing, either up the chain within the employer or directly to 
outsiders such a government agencies or media members.160  The 
wrongful discharge tort is a societal imposition on the flexibility of the at-
will doctrine: that doctrine cannot be used to discharge employees when 
they are acting in the public interest.  It thus forges an alliance between 
employees and the public against the employer when the employer 
engages in harmful conduct.161  Employer discretion is also bounded by 
numerous antidiscrimination statutory schemes that apply to employer 
termination or discipline.  Federal law protects employees from 
                                                                                                                                                              
(discussing how workers' compensation insurance replaced tort law with a no-fault 
compensation scheme). 
154 Anthony J. Barkume & John W. Ruser, Deregulating Property-Casualty Insurance 
Pricing: The Case of Workers' Compensation, 44 J.L. & ECON. 37, 43 (2001) (noting that 
“states generally require workers' compensation insurance coverage”). 
155 RESTATEMENT  OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.01 (2015). 
156 See, e.g., id. § 2.02 (providing for contractual exceptions to at-will); § 2.03 (explaining 
cause requirements for contractual agreements for employment as to a definite term); § 
2.05 (explaining the role of employer policy statements within the employment 
agreement); § 2.07 (discussing the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing within the 
employment relationship). 
157 Id. § 5.01. 
158 Id. § 5.02(a). 
159 Id. § 5.02(e). 
160 Id. § 5.02(e) cmt. f. 
161 For a discussion of the employee’s bifurcated loyalty between firm and polity in the 
context of wrongful discharge doctrine, see Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational 
Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97 CAL. L. REV. 433 (2009). 
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discrimination based on race, ethnicity, sex, religion, age, and disability.162  
State and local laws provide additional protections for these categories as 
well as additional ones, such as sexual orientation.163 
 When employees are discharged otherwise lawfully, state law 
provides for unemployment compensation for a set period of time.164  
These laws were originally designed to provide disincentives for employers 
from firing workers by making them responsible for post-termination 
remuneration.165  Although states manage their own systems, as a general 
rule they require employers to pay into an unemployment insurance 
fund166 and require compensation when the employee is terminated unless 
the employee has quit or has engaged in significant malfeasance.167  Thus, 
                                                          
162 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (making it an unlawful practice to “discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”); 29 
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2012) (providing similar protections against age discrimination within 
the employment relationship); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) (providing similar protections 
against disability discrimination). 
163 1 Compensation and Benefits § 8:4 (“Nearly every state has a fair employment practice 
(FEP) law, and most states also have their own administrative agencies to investigate 
charges of discrimination and enforce these FEP laws. Almost 200 local jurisdictions also 
have FEP laws and companion enforcement agencies.”). 
164 See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 1051 (7th ed. 2011) 
(“Fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have individual unemployment 
insurance (UI) programs determining the length of unemployment insurance benefits 
and their amounts for qualifying recipients.”).  For an overview of the federal-state 
unemployment insurance program, see U.S. Dep’t of Labor, State Unemployment 
Insurance Benefits, http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uifactsheet.asp (last 
visited February 5, 2016). 
165 JOHN A. GARATY, UNEMPLOYMENT IN HISTORY: ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND PUBLIC POLICY 
213 (1978) (discussing a 1932 Wisconsin law which required a reserve fund with payouts 
to terminated workers). 
166 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, State Unemployment Insurance Benefits, 
http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uifactsheet.asp (last visited February 5, 
2016) (“In the majority of States, benefit funding is based solely on a tax imposed on 
employers. (Three (3) States require minimal employee contributions.)”).  However, the 
federal government has provided significant funding for unemployment compensation, 
particularly in the wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis.  See ROTHSTEIN & LIEBMAN, supra 
note MRLL1, at 1051. 
167 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, State Unemployment Insurance Benefits, 
http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uifactsheet.asp (last visited February 5, 
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unemployment insurance only kicks in if the employee is not deemed (at 
least in part) responsible for her termination.   
 
6. Duties to bargain and allow collective representation 
 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)168 is the closest that labor 
and employment regulation comes to addressing the management and 
governance of the employer.  Under the NLRA, the employer (whatever its 
organizational form) must bargain with its employees’ chosen 
representative over the employees’ terms and conditions of employment.169  
A complex array of subsidiary obligations flow from this central one, such 
as the prohibition against employer discipline or discharge because of an 
employee’s protected concerted activity.170  The employer need not agree 
to any specific set of terms, but it must bargain in good faith and abide by 
the complex system of federal labor law for managing this bargaining 
relationship. 
 Unlike other duties imposed upon employers within the 
employment relationship, the duty to bargain does not require minimum 
employment terms or impose substantive obligations on the employer’s 
business.  Instead, the NLRA makes employers negotiate with employees 
as a group and prohibits employers from contracting individually with 
employees outside of collective bargaining.171  Framers of the NLRA 
intended to introduce a form of “industrial democracy” into the business 
                                                                                                                                                              
2016) (“You must be determined to be unemployed through no fault of your own 
(determined under State law), and meet other eligibility requirements of State law.”). 
168 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000). 
169 Id. §158(a)(5) (holding it to be an unfair labor practice for an employer “to refuse to 
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees”). 
170 See id. § 158(a)(1), (3) (2006) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—(1) 
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in 
section 157 of this title; . . .  (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of 
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage 
membership in any labor organization . . . .”). 
171 J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944) (“The very purpose of providing by 
statute for the collective agreement is to supersede the terms of separate agreements of 
employees with terms which reflect the strength and bargaining power and serve the 
welfare of the group.”). 
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world and provide employees with a voice in workplace governance.172  
Labor and management would work together to set the course for the 
business, in a form of self-regulation.  In fact, employers have exemptions 
from certain ERISA responsibilities when they are in a collective 
bargaining relationship or when they have arrived at a collective 
bargaining agreement.173  The idea is that when employees have power 
within the organization, there is less of a need to impose worker-friendly 
terms from the outside. 
 
B. Employer Duties on Behalf of Employees 
 
 In addition to duties owed to their employees, employers also have 
duties to third parties on behalf of their employees.  The oldest and best-
known of these duties are the employer’s responsibilities under respondeat 
superior.  An employer is liable for the acts of its employees committed 
within the scope of employment.174  Although many different justifications 
for the doctrine have been given, most center around the responsibility for 
                                                          
172 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: HEARINGS ON S. 1958 BEFORE THE SENATE COMM. ON 
EDUCATION AND LABOR, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 642 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1617, at 2028 (1949) (statement of 
Senator Robert F. Wagner that “[t]hat is just the very purpose of this legislation, to provide 
industrial democracy”). 
173 See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 410(a)(26)(E) (2012) (exempting multiemployer plans that benefit 
only collective bargaining unit employees from certain minimum participation 
requirements); Treas. Reg. § 1.410(b)--2(b)(7) (2012) (same). 
174 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006) (“An employer is subject to liability for 
torts committed by employees while acting within the scope of their employment.”).  
employers are generally not liable for acts of independent contractors.  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965) (“Except as stated in §§ 410–429, the employer of an 
independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or 
omission of the contractor or his servants.”).  The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
enumerates three exceptions: (1) the employer is negligent in “selecting, instructing, or 
supervising the contractor;” (2) the employer has a nondelegable duty of care to the 
public as a whole or the particular plaintiff; or (3) the work done by the contractor for the 
employer is “specially” or “inherently” dangerous.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 
cmt. b (1965).  The employer is also liable when it has performed a contract using 
independent contractors when those services were accepted in the belief that they were to 
be performed by the employer and its employees—an “apparent employee” scenario.  Id. 
§ 429. 
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or control of the employer over the employee.175  United States common 
law used to follow the “fellow servant” rule, in which the employer was 
absolved of liability to an employee for an injury caused by a fellow 
employee.176  However, this rule has rendered obsolete by workers 
compensation statutes, and it would not likely remain the law if 
reconsidered today.177  Employers may also be criminally responsible for 
the misdeeds of their employees if committed within the scope of 
employment.178  In order to satisfy the mens rea requirement, courts have 
additionally required that the employee have acted with the intent to 
benefit the business entity.179  
Firms are also given responsibility for their employees when it 
comes to taxes.  Employers must withhold their employees’ taxes180 and 
must pay a share of Social Security and Medicare (FICA)181 and 
                                                          
175 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 499–501 (W. 
Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984). 
176 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 474 (1958) (“A master is not liable to a servant 
or subservant who, while acting within the scope of his employment or in connection 
therewith, is injured solely by the negligence of a fellow servant in the performance of 
acts not involving a violation of the master's non-delegable duties, unless the servant was 
coerced or deceived into serving, was too young to appreciate the risks, or was employed 
in violation of statute.”). 
177 KEETON ET AL., supra note PK1, at 575–76; J.M. Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The 
Positive Economic Theory of Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1447, 1487 (1987) (reviewing 
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 
(1987)) ("[T]he fellow servant rule is like a mastodon preserved in a glacier—it was 
rendered obsolete by workers' compensation, and, given the general trend of twentieth 
century tort law, there can be no question that if workers' compensation were abolished 
today few courts would follow the fellow servant rule in industrial accident cases."). 
178 See New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909).  
Although the “scope of employment” rule has faced steady criticism over the years, it has 
become “firmly entrenched as, more or less, the across-the-board rule of enterprise 
liability for all manner of crimes.”  Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity 
Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 475–76 (2006); see also Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially 
Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 836 (1994) (stating 
that the existing legal regime closely approximates a rule of “pure strict vicarious 
liability” (internal citation marks omitted)). 
179 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1962) (describing 
the requirements as elements of liability taken from civil tort law). 
180 26 U.S.C. §§ 3401(c), 3402 (2006). 
181 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101, 3121(d) (2006). 
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unemployment (FUTA) taxes.182  The IRS defines employees based on the 
common law control test.183  Employer withholding extremely important 
to the public fisc; payroll taxes alone make up 34 percent of all federal 
revenues.184  And the consequences of an employer misclassification can be 
extremely costly, as the business is then subject to the mandatory back-tax 
formula.185 
These employer duties—both to employees and on behalf of 
employees to third parties—express the depth of the legal relationship 
between employer and employee.  The employee is not simply an agent 
tasked with handling the principal’s matters; she is a part of the employer’s 
responsibilities and both owes duties and is owed duties.  These duties help 
to paint a picture of a fiduciary relationship that runs not only from 
employees to employers, but also from employers to employees. 
 
 
IV.  EMPLOYERS AS FIDUCIARIES 
 
 This section explores potential theories for a set of fiduciary 
obligations flowing from employers to their employees.  It first addresses 
why the contractual duty of good faith is not sufficient to handle the 
relational aspects of the employment contract.  Second, it discusses other 
academic proposals for the creation of employer fiduciary duties.  Finally, 
                                                          
182 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 3306(i) (2006). 
183  26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)(2) (2006) (defining an employee as, among other definitions, “any 
individual who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the 
employer-employee relationship, has the status of an employee”); 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(d)-
1(c)(2) (2012) (finding an employment relationship “when the person for whom services 
are performed has the right to control and direct the individual who performs the 
services, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to the details 
and means by which that result is accomplished”); see 26 U.S.C. § 3306(i) (2006) (stating 
that “the term ‘employee’ has the meaning assigned to such term by section 3121(d)”); 
Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, 298–99 (laying out a twenty factor test to aid in 
“determining whether an individual is an employee under the common law rules”). 
184 Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, Policy Basics: Federal Payroll Taxes, April 2, 
2014, http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/policy-basics-federal-payroll-taxes. 
185 26 U.S.C. § 3509(a) (2006).  In fact, Congress was moved to create a safe harbor.  
Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 530, 92 Stat. 2885. 
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it argues for the recognition of a reciprocal fiduciary relationship by 
drawing on insights from fiduciary theory and the theory of the firm. 
 
A. The Contractual Duty of Good Faith in the Employment Relationship 
 
 Given that employees and employers have a contractual 
relationship, it may seem fruitful to explore a robust version of the duty of 
good faith before looking to fiduciary duties.  Indeed, good faith has been 
characterized as “halfway between a fiduciary duty (the duty 
of utmost good faith) and the duty merely to refrain from active fraud.”186  
Good faith in performance is generally recognized as an implied term in 
all contracts under the common law.187  The sense of the good faith duty is 
that contractual partners owe obligations of performance that go beyond 
the simple black letter of the agreement.  Although these obligations do 
not have exact definitions,188 several distinct threads have been noted.  The 
Uniform Commercial Code characterized good faith simply as “honesty in 
fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.”189  One common expansion 
upon this definition is the notion of good faith as an obligation to 
                                                          
186 Market St. Associates Ltd. P'ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991).  See also 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 
425, 438 (1993) (“Good faith in contract merges into fiduciary duties, with a blur and not a 
line.”). 
187 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (“Every contract imposes upon 
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”); 
Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1431 (2014) (finding that “most States 
recognize some form of the good faith and fair dealing doctrine”).  The duty finds its roots 
in traditional Roman and canon law, in which the doctrine imposed “an obligation to deal 
honestly, forthrightly, and faithfully with one's commercial counterpart in both 
negotiation and performance.”  Samuel W. Buell, Good Faith and Law Evasion, 58 UCLA 
L. REV. 611, 627-28 (2011). 
188 Northwest, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 1431 (“[I]t does not appear that there is any uniform 
understanding of the doctrine’s precise meaning.”).  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (“A complete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible, but 
the following types are among those which have been recognized in judicial decisions: 
evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of 
imperfect performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, and interference with or failure 
to cooperate in the other party's performance.”). 
189 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(19).   
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effectuate the reasonable intentions of the parties – the spirit, rather than 
the letter, of the contractual terms.190  Somewhat more rarely, the duty has 
been used to ensure that “a party does not violate community standards of 
decency, fairness, or reasonableness.”191  Courts could use good faith to 
ensure that employers live up to the reasonable expectations of the parties 
when it comes to the employment relationship, or to police businesses to 
make sure that they were treating workers according to norms of fairness 
and decency.  Such a programme of good faith enforcement might 
mitigate or obviate the need for additional employer fiduciary duties. 
 Ultimately, however, the doctrine of good faith in the employment 
contract does not serve the same role as a fiduciary relationship.  First, 
purely as doctrinal matter, good faith has had a fraught history within 
employment.192  Many jurisdictions refuse to recognize a duty of good faith 
when the underlying employment agreement is at-will.193  Their refusal 
stems from the complete discretion that at-will termination provides to the 
employer.  In their view, it is nonsensical to impose a duty of good faith 
when the contract explicitly allows the employer to fire the employer for 
any reason at all.194  If the employer has complete freedom to fire under 
                                                          
190 See Northwest, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 1431 (noting that “some States are said to use the 
doctrine to effectuate the intentions of parties or to protect their reasonable expectations” 
(citation and quotations omitted)).   
191 Id. (citations and quotations omitted). 
192 See James J. Brudney, Reluctance and Remorse: The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing in American Employment Law, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 773, 773 (2011) (“In 
the employment setting, however, the covenant has not fared nearly so well.”). 
193 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.07, Reporters’ Notes to Cmt. a (“Some courts do 
not recognize the implied covenant in at-will employment or significantly limit its 
scope.”); Brudney, supra note JJB1, at 773-74 (“The majority of states have declined to 
apply Good Faith at all when reviewing disputes between employers and individual 
employees.”). 
194 See, e.g., Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chemical Co., 837 A.2d 759, 768 (Conn. 2004) 
(“Employment at will grants both parties the right to terminate the relationship for any 
reason, or no reason, at any time without fear of legal liability.”); Darrow v. Integris 
Health, Inc., 176 P.3d 1204, 1210 (Okla. 2008) (“Employers are free to discharge at will 
employees in good or bad faith, with or without cause.”); Morriss v. Coleman Company, 
Inc., 241 Kan. 501, 518, 738 P.2d 841 (1987) (implied covenant “should not be applicable to 
employment-at-will contracts”); Sanchez v. The New Mexican, 106 N.M. 76, 738 P.2d 1321, 
1324 (1987) (“[T]here is no contract of employment upon which the law can impose the 
stated duty to exercise good faith and fair dealing. Sanchez was an ‘at will’ employee who 
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the express terms of the contract, the argument goes, then one cannot 
impose an implied good-faith obligation that would impose some duty to 
follow societal norms or “reasonable expectations.” 195  There was a general 
intellectual effort, adopted to some extent in California, to use the duty of 
good faith to weaken the at-will presumption and create something closer 
to a “good cause” standard for termination.196  However, that movement 
has gradually disappeared from the scholarship, and California rejected 
good faith as a vehicle for undermining at-will.197 
 A number of jurisdictions, as well as the Restatement of 
Employment Law, have carved out a limited role for good faith and fair 
dealing in the employment context.  The duty only applies when the 
employer is proactively using its termination power (or other power) to 
                                                                                                                                                              
could be dismissed for any or no reason.”). See also Cramer v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 182 
Ohio App. 3d 653, 663 (2009); Brozo v. Oracle Corp., 324 F.3d 661, 668 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(applying Minnesota law); Miller v. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 455 S.E.2d 799, 802 (W. Va. 
1995); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Wis. 1983). 
195 See Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 108 P.3d 380, 390 (Idaho 2005) (“[T]he covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing does not alter the right to fire an at will employee; that is, the 
covenant does not create good cause as a requirement.”). Cf. Brudney, supra note JJB1, at 
775 (“It is not surprising that state courts are reluctant to impose norms of fairness on job 
security arrangements when employers' residual authority to act in summary, arbitrary, 
or malicious fashion toward their employees remains legislatively undisturbed.”). 
196 See Cleary v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (Ct. App. 1980) (“Termination of 
employment without legal cause after such a period of time offends the implied-in-law 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in all contracts, including employment 
contracts. As a result of this covenant, a duty arose on the part of the employer, American 
Airlines, to do nothing which would deprive plaintiff, the employee, of the benefits of the 
employment bargain-benefits described in the complaint as having accrued during 
plaintiff's 18 years of employment.); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against 
Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 
1836-37 (1980) (“By implying a duty to terminate only in good faith, courts can provide a 
private remedy for wrongful discharge to replace the at will rule.”); see also Pugh v. See's 
Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927-28 (Ct. App. 1981) (discussing good faith but also 
ultimately relying on implied contractual promise). 
197 Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc.,  8 P.3d 1089, 1112 (Cal. 2000) (“ To the extent Guz's implied 
covenant [of good faith] cause of action seeks to impose limits on Bechtel's termination 
rights beyond those to which the parties actually agreed, the claim is invalid.”); Foley v. 
Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 398 (Cal. 1988) (rejecting a claim in tort for 
violations of the duty of good faith on the grounds that “the employment relationship is 
fundamentally contractual“). 
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deprive the employee of some benefit that has already been earned under 
the contract.  So the duty is violated if the employer prevents the vesting 
or accrual of an employee right or benefit; if the employer retaliates 
against an employee because of an earned right or benefit; or if the 
employer retaliates because the employee performed his or her obligations 
under the employment contract itself or under the law.198  When it comes 
to compensation and benefits that have been earned under the contract, 
the employer is not permitted to use its termination power to pressure the 
employee into foregoing them.  For example, in Fortune v. Nat’l Cash 
Register Co.,199 a salesman was fired soon after securing a big deal that 
would have earned him a large bonus; the purpose of the termination was 
to deprive him of that bonus.  The court held that the employer violated 
the duty of good faith by firing him to deprive him of the benefits of the 
bonus structure.200  This definition of good faith fits well within the 
historical ambit of the doctrine, as it goes beyond the explicit text of the 
agreement to prevent one party from opportunistically acting to deprive 
the other party of the benefit of the bargain.201  But it is also carefully 
cabined to a limited set of specific circumstances.202  There must be an 
                                                          
198 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT §§ 2.07(c), 3.05(c). 
199 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Mass. 1977). 
200 Id. at 1258 (“Where the principal seeks to deprive the agent of all compensation by 
terminating the contractual relationship when the agent is on the brink of successfully 
completing the sale, the principal has acted in bad faith and the ensuing transaction 
between the principal and the buyer is to be regarded as having been accomplished by the 
agent.” (citing to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 454 & cmt. a (1958))). 
201 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.07 (“[T]he employer's duty to cooperate means 
that once an employee has substantially performed, unless there is independent cause for 
termination, the employer cannot use its right to terminate without cause for the purpose 
of depriving the employee of the benefit of the contract.”); Steven J. Burton, Breach of 
Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 387 
(1980) (“Bad faith performance consists of an exercise of discretion in performance to 
recapture opportunities forgone at formation.”); see also Oliver E. Williamson, 
Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & ECON. 
233, 234 (1979) (discussing opportunism in the contractual context). 
202 Cf. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.07 cmt. b (arguing that “the implied duty of 
good faith and fair dealing serves as a supplementary aid in implementing the parties' 
reasonable expectations and should not be read as a means of overriding the basic terms 
of, or otherwise undermining the essential nature of, their contractual relationship”). 
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effort by the employer to prevent the employee from receiving a specific 
benefit that has already vested or been earned under the contract.  This 
generally-accepted definition of good faith in the employment context, 
while offering well-justified protection, does not evidence the type of 
mutual, fiduciary-based relationship to which this Article is pointing.  It is 
simply an employment version of the contractual duty of good faith. 
 This Article points to an employment relationship that goes beyond 
contract and beyond good faith.  Of course, good faith and fiduciary duties 
are related: they are cousins, perhaps, or even siblings in the family tree of 
legal doctrine.203  But as Gordon Smith has pointed out, “the scope of these 
two doctrines is sufficiently different that they are not often viewed as 
tackling related problems.”204  Most importantly, the duty of good faith is 
contractual, while the fiduciary duties are relational.205  As this Article 
argues below,206 the nature of the employment relationship is based in our 
concept of the firm.  It is the employee’s relationship with the firm that 
separates the employment contract from those of independent contractors 
that might also provide “work” for the employer.207  Independent 
contractors are protected by a contractual duty of good faith.  But 
employees should have something more—something that reflects the 
deeper relationship that employment provides. Rather than promoting a 
version of the duty of good faith in the employment context that takes on 
relational characteristics,208 the Article argues for the application of 
relational duties, rather than simply contractual ones.  
                                                          
203 D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
1399, 1487 (2002) (“Fiduciary duty and the duty of good faith and fair dealing are 
variations on a theme.”). 
204 Id. at 1488. 
205 Id. (“While fiduciary duty is determined by the structure of the relationship, the 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing emanates from the terms of the contract.”). 
206 See part IV.C infra. 
207 See Bodie, supra note MTB1. 
208 For example, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the duty of good faith and fair dealing to 
potentially require an employer to inform its employee about an upcoming merger.  
Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (1987).  The court held that “an avowedly 
opportunistic discharge is a breach of contract” under the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing.  Id. at 438.  In addition, the employee was a shareholder in the employer, which 
was a closely held company, and the court held that “[c]lose corporations buying their 
own stock, like knowledgeable insiders of closely held firms buying from outsiders, have 
 




B. Prior Theories of Employer Fiduciary Duties to Employees 
 
Suggestions for the creation of employer fiduciary duties range 
from specific, particularized duties to a broader set of responsibilities.  
Those advocating for particular duties often point to a pre-existing 
employer responsibility and build a fiduciary duty around that 
responsibility. For example, Margaux Hall argued that employers act as 
fiduciaries when they make health-care coverage decisions on behalf of 
their employees as part of an employer-provided plan.209  Although many 
employers have long provided health-care benefits to their employees, this 
responsibility was heightened through the Affordable Care Act’s 
“employer mandate.”210  Because employers are so integral to employees’ 
health care decisions, they play a unique rule in managing choices that go 
to the core of employees’ personal and family lives.  Hall proposed that 
employers be considered employee “health fiduciaries” that make health-
care-related decisions in the interests of their employee-beneficiaries.211  
                                                                                                                                                              
a fiduciary duty to disclose material facts.”  Id. at 435.  For contrasting views on the import 
of the court’s decision in Jordan, compare Marleen O’Connor, Restructuring the 
Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced 
Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1249-50 (1991) (arguing that Jordan created “an implied 
fiduciary duty that the stock would not be bought back in an opportunistic fashion”) with 
Deborah DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L. J. 
879, 887 (“[T]he employer’s ability in Jordan to terminate the plaintiff’s employment and 
thereby oblige him to sell his shares to the corporation is irrelevant to the employer’s 
obligation, as fiduciary, to disclose information to the selling shareholder.”).  See also 
Aline van Bever, An Employer's Duty to Provide Information and Advice on Economic 
Risks?, 42 INDUS. L.J. 1 (2013) (considering “whether the implied duty of trust and 
confidence has developed so as to impose on the employer a duty to inform, advise and 
warn his employees on economic risks”). 
 For a discussion of a strengthened duty of good faith as applied to employees, see 
Jeffrey M. Judd, Note, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Examining 
Employees' Good Faith Duties, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 483, 485 (1988) (arguing that “under 
appropriate circumstances a court might find that an employee who abuses a special 
position of trust and confidence is liable to his employer for tortious breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in his employment contract”). 
209 Hall, supra note MH1, at 1737. 
210 Id. at 1751-52. 
211 Id. at 1759-65. 
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Under this fiduciary relationship, employers would need to “(1) pursue 
employees' sole interest in making discretionary coverage decisions; and 
(2) refrain from acting in a self-interested manner.”212  Although the 
specifics of these duties raise difficulties in hammering out, the creation of 
a fiduciary relationship here “clarifies the underlying entitlements and 
interests,” “helps bound otherwise unlimited discretion around formative 
duties,” and “illuminates the deeper structural role that employers play in 
this space.”213   
Employers have also been targeted for obligations related to their 
handling of private employee information.  Scott Fast has argued that 
employers should owe a duty of confidentiality to their employees similar 
to that owed in other fiduciary relationships.214  Pointing to the sensitivity 
of employee information on job performance, personal health, and 
financial records, Fast argued that employers should be considered to have 
a confidential relationship with their employees.215  Employers would be 
liable for disclosing confidential employee information to third parties 
under a tort theory similar to fiduciary duties.216  The Restatement of 
Employment Law has adopted at least part of this approach by noting that 
an employee has a protected privacy interest “in personal information 
related to the employee that is provided in confidence to the employer.”217  
The employer is liable in tort for providing such confidential information 
to third parties without consent, if such disclosure is highly offensive.218 
Progressive corporate law scholars have called for the imposition of 
fiduciary duties on corporations that would run to corporate stakeholders 
                                                          
212 Id. at 1763. 
213 Id. at 1768.  See also Lauren R. Roth, The Collective Fiduciary, 94 NEB. L. REV. ___ (2016) 
(discussing employer and insurer duties when deciding whether to grant health benefits 
under health insurance plans). 
214 Scott L. Fast, Breach of Employee Confidentiality: Moving Toward a Common-Law 
Tort Remedy, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 433 (1993) (“[C]ourts could provide a common-law 
remedy for disclosures to third parties in much the same way that they recognize the 
confidentiality of physician-patient or attorney-client relationships.”). 
215 Id. at 456-59. 
216 Id.  
217 RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 7.05(a) (2015). 
218 Id. §§ 7.05(b) & 7.06. 
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beyond shareholders. 219  In some instances, employees have been given a 
special role amongst stakeholders.  Some of these calls for fiduciary duties 
to employees are designed to mirror similar existing duties from the 
corporation to shareholders.  Kent Greenfield has argued that “workers 
should have some kind of representation on the board of directors or have 
some role in electing directors, and that directors of companies should be 
held to have some kind of fiduciary duties to workers in the employ of 
their firm.”220  Greenfield has also advocated for a specific prohibition 
against fraud in the context of the employment relationship, as a parallel 
obligation to Rule 10b-5, which prohibits fraud in the context of the sale of 
a security.221  The specific critique of existing policies behind these 
proposals is that shareholders have been given specially protected status 
within the corporation, and other stakeholders—especially employees—
deserve similar protections.   
There have also been specific suggestions for limited extensions of 
corporate fiduciary duties to employees in particular contexts.  Marleen 
O’Connor has proposed that corporate directors should owe a duty to 
employees during fundamental corporate changes.222  Although flexibly 
defined, the essence of the duty would require that “directors take the 
actions that are necessary to compensate employees for their investments 
in the corporation.”223  Drawing in part from corporate constituency 
statutes, which gave directors the freedom to act on behalf of all corporate 
stakeholders when making decisions as to transformative transactions, 224 
                                                          
219 For example, Margaret Blair has argued that boards of directors should take into 
account the effects of their decisions on all of the corporation’s stakeholders, not just 
shareholders.  MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 16 (1995). 
220 Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 287 
(1998). 
221 Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified Absence of Federal Fraud Protection in the Labor 
Market, 107 YALE L.J. 715, 785-86 (1997) (proposing a model rule based on the text of Rule 
10b-5). 
222 O’Connor, supra note MOC1, at 1247-59. 
223 Id. at 1253. 
224 See, e.g., Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee 
Governance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227, 1232-36 (2004) (discussing arguments for and 
against constituency statutes); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical 
Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1992). 
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this duty would up the ante by making directors responsible to defend 
employee interests during these transactions.  O’Connor justified this duty 
on the basis of employee “investments of time and human capital,” in 
conjunction with their “trust and confidence” in directors to manage their 
investments on their behalf.225  In particular, O’Connor believed that the 
fiduciary duty “should include an obligation for the directors to safeguard 
pension plan assets during hostile battles for control and internal 
recapitalizations.”226  In a similar vein, Katherine Stone argued for 
fiduciary duties that are owed to all stakeholders but would be enforceable 
by employees.227  These duties would stem from corporate constituency 
statutes and would protect employees “from major corporate restructuring 
decisions that threaten to expropriate those investments.”228   
These arguments for corporate director fiduciary duties to 
employees all have in common a “stakeholder” model of the corporation.  
They are contraposed to the “shareholder primacy” model of the 
corporation, under which shareholders govern the company and should 
have the sole right to enforce fiduciary duties against directors.229  At the 
risk of giving short-shrift to this debate,230 it is more about the legal 
                                                          
225 O’Connor, supra note MOC1, at 1252. 
226 Id. at 1254. 
227 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders under State Nonshareholder 
Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 48 (1991).  See also Kent Greenfield, The 
Third Way, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 749, 751 (2014) (arguing that directors should owe their 
fiduciary duties to the corporation as a whole, including all of its stakeholders). 
228 Id.  But see Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for 
Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 
STETSON L. REV. 23, 25 (1991) (arguing that “nonshareholder constituency statutes fail to 
recognize that fiduciary duties are owed to residual claimants and residual claimants 
alone because this is the group that faces the most severe set of contracting problems 
with respect to defining the nature and extent of the obligations owed to them by officers 
and directors”). 
229 See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 211 (shareholder franchise); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 
811 (Del. 1984) (“The derivative action developed in equity to enable shareholders to sue 
in the corporation's name where those in control of the company refused to assert a claim 
belonging to it.”). 
230 Grant Hayden and I have engaged in this debate as well.  Grant Hayden & Matthew T. 
Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 2071, 2120 (2010) (arguing for a “reexamination of the scope of the 
corporate franchise” to include other stakeholders). 
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structure of the corporation and of corporate governance than it is about 
the relationship between employer and employee.  Although a large 
portion of employees are employed by public corporations, a large portion 
are not.231  Developing a corporate director’s duty to employees does not 
address whether similar duties would be owed by members of an LLC or 
managing partners in a partnership—and if not, why not.  Although 
commentators have recognized this,232 they have not developed a 
corresponding set of duties to employees within these other business 
organizations.  This paper takes a different approach.  By discussing duties 
owed by employers to employees, the particular type of business 
organization becomes irrelevant to the analysis.233  And the duties owed by 
the employer stem specifically from the employer-employee 
relationship—not from the mix of participants in a particular type of 
business enterprise. 
 
C. Employers as Fiduciaries under Agency & Fiduciary Theory 
 
 The traditional debate over the fiduciary nature of employment has 
focused on employees—specifically, employees as agents.  Employees are 
fiduciaries because they are a subspecies of agents.  The theory behind 
agents as fiduciaries is relatively simple.  Characterized as falling within 
one of the “core” categories of fiduciary relationship,234 agents have power 
over the interests of their principals and are empowered to act on behalf of 
the principals.  Agents have discretion in carrying out their responsibilities 
as agents.  This discretion requires contracts that are sufficiently 
                                                          
231 Andrew Lundeen & Kyle Pomerleau, Corporations Make Up 5 Percent of Businesses 
but Earn 62 Percent of Revenues, TAX POLICY BLOG, Nov. 25, 2014, at: 
http://taxfoundation.org/blog/corporations-make-5-percent-businesses-earn-62-percent-
revenues.   
232 Greenfield, supra note KG-PW, at 317 n.161 (“While the focus of this Article is on 
corporations, this argument from the relational basis of fiduciary duty might conceivably 
be extended to all employer/employee relationships, even when the employer is not a 
corporation.”). 
233 As discussed in Part V, however, the governance of that organization is relevant—
particularly the degree to which employees participate in that governance. 
234 Miller, supra PMFR, at 76, 79-80. 
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incomplete to require fiduciary duties.235  Employees are agents because 
they similarly have discretion over the interests of the employer, and they 
receive delegated authority to act in the interests of the employer.236 
 But this analysis is missing half of the equation.  Both employees 
and the employer have a set of mutual interests that differentiate 
employment from other contractual relationships.  And that relationship 
gives both employees and employer discretion over aspects of the 
relationship that allow for opportunism.  For these reasons, the employer 
should also be considered to be a fiduciary for its employees.  As discussed 
further below, the employer—as legal entity, and as aggregate of the 
individuals who make up the employer—has relational responsibilities in 
the vein of fiduciary duties.  It therefore makes sense to characterize the 
employment relationship as a whole as fiduciary, and the employer as a 
fiduciary of its employees. 
 There are several approaches in fiduciary theory for determining 
whether a relationship should be characterized as fiduciary in nature.  
Many courts follow a status-based approach in which the relationship is 
fiduciary if it has historically been categorized as such.237  As a theoretical 
matter, this approach is fairly unsatisfying, as it is based on history and 
only recognizes new categories (if any) by a purely analogical method.238  
But there is support for a status-based approach to employment as a 
fiduciary relationship.  Employees, of course, have traditionally been 
treated as fiduciaries.  And as discussed in Part III, employers have 
gradually accreted a plethora of statutory, regulatory, and even common-
law responsibilities for their employees that are fiduciary in substance.  
Thus, it is not too radical to envision the employment relationship as a 
                                                          
235 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note EF1, at 427 (“[A] ‘fiduciary’ relation is a 
contractual one characterized by unusually high costs of specification and monitoring.”). 
236 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 429 cmt. a (1958) (“The principles determining 
the servant's duties to the principal are the same as those in regard to other agents . . . .”). 
237 Deborah A. DeMott, Relationships of Trust and Confidence in the Workplace, 100 
CORNELL L. REV. 1255, 1261 (2015) (“Most fiduciary relationships are treated as such as a 
matter of status or convention.” (quotations omitted)); Paul B. Miller, A Theory of 
Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 241-43 (2011) (stating that courts determine 
“whether the category is conventionally recognized as fiduciary”). 
238 Id. (“[N]ew categories of relationship are recognized as fiduciary simply by virtue of 
having been found sufficiently similar to a paradigmatic category . . . .”). 
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mutual fiduciary relationship, even if employers have not traditionally 
been treated as fiduciaries. 
Other courts have shunned a categorical or status-based approach 
and instead treated each particular relationship at issue as potentially 
fiduciary under a fact-based approach.239  The indicia of fiduciary status 
vary from court to court.  Common-law courts have at various times 
looked at the following factors: the ability of the fiduciary to exercise 
discretion in carrying out its tasks;240 the vulnerability of the beneficiary to 
the fiduciary’s exercise of power and potential opportunism;241 the trust 
and confidence reposed in the fiduciary by the beneficiary;242 and 
reasonable expectations of the parties.243  These factors all support specific 
theories of fiduciary responsibility, which will be discussed in more depth 
below. 
 Many of the most prominent fiduciary theorists place the primary 
emphasis on discretion.  Paul Miller has defined the fiduciary relationship 
as “one in which one party (the fiduciary) enjoys discretionary power over 
the significant practical interests of another (the beneficiary).”244  Gordon 
Smith has stated that: “fiduciary relationships form when one party (the 
‘fiduciary’) acts on behalf of another party (the ‘beneficiary’) while 
                                                          
239 Id. at 243-47. 
240 Zastrow v. Journal Commc'ns, Inc., 718 N.W.2d 51, 59 (Wis. 2006) (“A consistent facet of 
a fiduciary duty is the constraint on the fiduciary's discretion to act in his own self-interest 
because by accepting the obligation of a fiduciary he consciously sets another's interests 
before his own.”). 
241 Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The common law imposes that 
[fiduciary] duty when the disparity between the parties in knowledge or power relevant to 
the performance of an undertaking is so vast that it is a reasonable inference that had the 
parties in advance negotiated expressly over the issue they would have agreed that the 
agent owed the principal the high duty that we have described, because otherwise the 
principal would be placing himself at the agent's mercy.”). 
242 Wiener v. Lazard Freres & Co., 672 N.Y.S.2d 8, 14 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (inquiring as to 
whether one party “reposed confidence in another and reasonably relied on the other’s 
superior expertise and knowledge”). 
243 DeMott, supra note DDM-Cornell, at 1261 (finding that “courts impose ad hoc or fact-
based fiduciary duties when although the parties' relationship was not categorically 
fiduciary, its characteristics nonetheless justified one party's expectation of loyal conduct 
from the other”). 
244 Id. at 262 (italics omitted); see also Miller, supra note PMFR, at 69. 
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exercising discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the 
beneficiary.”245  And Larry Ribstein has argued that fiduciary duties should 
apply “where an ‘owner’ who controls and derives the residual benefit from 
property delegates open-ended management power over property to a 
‘manager.’”246  The notion of discretion as critical to fiduciary relationships 
forms the cornerstone of many fiduciary theories. 
The employment relationship fits this paradigm.  An employee is a 
fiduciary of the employer because the employee exercises discretion in 
carrying out the duties of employment.247  However, an employer also 
exercises discretion over the employees’ practical interests and critical 
resources.  The employer—the legal entity that employs the employees—
controls the employees’ employment as well as the fruits of the employees’ 
labor.  The joint production accomplished by employees working together 
with the capital provided by equity contributors is what constitutes the 
firm.248  And the controllers of the firm have a fiduciary responsibility to 
employees over the management of that joint production.  Thus, the 
employees’ significant practical interests include: the terms and conditions 
of their employment,249 the structure of employment, the opportunities for 
                                                          
245 D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
1399, 1402 (2002).  See also D. Gordon Smith & Jordan C. Lee, Fiduciary Discretion, 75 
OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 644 (2014) (“The most commonly cited scholarly works in the canon of 
fiduciary law emphasize the importance of discretion in fiduciary relationships.”). 
246 Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 215.  See also Larry 
E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, 901 (2011) (“[M]y definition  [of 
fiduciary relationships] focuses on the particular type of entrustment that arises from a 
property owner's delegation to a manager of open-ended management power over 
property without corresponding economic rights.”). 
247 However, the amount of discretion afforded to an individual employee may vary 
widely based on the circumstances.  Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 
8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149, 154 (2005) (“Most employment relationships permit the 
employee at least some discretion in performing tasks.”); DeMott, supra note DDM-
Cornell, at 1256 (“[A]lthough a firm's employees share a common employer, the nature of 
their work spans a broad spectrum, ranging from responsibilities that necessarily involve 
exercising substantial discretion to closely monitored and highly specified tasks.”). 
248 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note AD1, at 794 (defining the firm to include “joint input 
production” and “several input owners”). 
249 Terms and conditions include not only wages, but also short-term and long-term 
benefits such as the health-care coverage.  See Hall, supra note MH1 (discussing 
employer control over health care). 
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promotion or termination, the distribution of responsibilities within the 
employer, and the distribution of resources within the employer.  In terms 
of a “critical resource,” the employer controls the critical resource of the 
employer’s ongoing business.250  Employees cannot individually take that 
business and operate it for themselves; the employer controls the business 
as well as the relationships, contracts, property, intellectual property, 
goodwill, and other legal aspects of the business.251  The employer 
exercises its discretion in making business decisions on behalf of those 
who participate in the business—namely, the equity investors and the 
labor contributors (employees).  The employer’s ongoing business is 
clearly a critical resource for employees.  Even Ribstein’s notion of 
property ownership would apply if we use the Alchian and Demsetz model 
of the firm that includes all firm inputs, such as capital and labor, as part 
of the firm’s property interests.252   
 A foreseeable objection to this approach is to argue that employees 
are not the beneficiaries of the employer with respect to the business 
enterprise.  Instead, the owners of the employer (in whatever organization 
form it takes) are the beneficiaries.  Thus, in a corporation, shareholders 
would arguably be the beneficiaries of the corporation’s exercise of its 
discretion over the critical resource of the corporation’s business.253  
However, while shareholders have an interest in the employer-
corporation’s business, employees are also beneficiaries who are interested 
in that business.  Shareholders are not traditional “owners” of the 
corporations in many respects; they at best have an ownership interest in a 
                                                          
250 Bainbridge, supra note SB-PM, at 661 (making the assumption for his model that 
“managers have substantial experience in running large organizations and, accordingly, 
are properly vested with almost unfettered discretion”). 
251 Cf. Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Trademarks and the Boundaries of the Firm, 51 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 345, 376 (2009) (“As in the case of the closely held mark, trademark 
law may serve to partition the reputational investment of the firm from that of the rank 
and file employee.”). 
252 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note AD1, at 794. 
253 This distinction matters more to Smith’s formulation, which requires that the critical 
resource “belong” to the beneficiary, Smith, supra note GS-CRT, at 1402, whereas Miller’s 
formulation requires only that the beneficiaries’ significant practical interests are at stake. 
Miller, supra note PMFR, at 69. 
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sliver of the corporation’s designated profits.254  While shareholders are 
clearly invested in the corporation and its business, employees are also 
invested.  Shareholders’ funds may be uniquely vulnerable, and their 
returns are more contingent and less defined that those provided to 
employees.255  However, the average employee arguably has more invested 
in the business enterprise that the average shareholder.256  Workers have 
invested their ongoing time and labor in the enterprise; they may also 
invest their careers and their vocational aspirations, as well as their 
                                                          
254 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: 
A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1428 (1993) (“The old [private 
property] model depended upon the corporation being a thing capable of being owned . . . 
. As we have seen, however, nexus of contracts theory squarely rejects this basic 
proposition.”); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2002) (“From both a legal and an economic perspective, the 
claim that shareholders own the public corporation simply is empirically incorrect.”).  
Moreover, employees need not be owners in order to have a claim to the critical resource.  
As Smith has elaborated: 
 
Whether the existence of a particular thing justifies the imposition of 
fiduciary duties, therefore, depends on whether that thing provides the 
fiduciary with the occasion to act opportunistically. And whether that 
thing provides the fiduciary with the occasion to act opportunistically will 
depend in large part on whether society has made a normative decision 
that the thing belongs to the beneficiary. This decision is exogenous to 
the critical resource theory. 
 
Smith, supra note GS-CRT, at 1444. 
255 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 67-70, 91 (1991).   
256 As Kent Greenfield notes: 
 
Most shareholders of public corporations have little in the way of a 
genuine relationship with the companies in which they hold stock, other 
than as arms-length investors.  A typical shareholder may have a 
significant amount of turnover in her portfolio in any given year.  
Workers, by contrast, have a close connection to the firm that employs 
them and may hold their jobs for years. 
 
Greenfield, supra note KG-PW, at 317-18. 
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personal character and identity.257  They invest in firm-specific capital that 
by definition is not alienable, unlike most stock investments.258  Along with 
the equity investors, they are the co-participants in the economic life of the 
firm.259   
 Vulnerability is also a critical feature of fiduciary relationships.  The 
beneficiary is vulnerable to the power/discretion of the fiduciary, which is 
what calls down fiduciary duties on the exercise of this power.260  If the 
beneficiary were able to protect itself through contract or other legal 
protection, it would not need the fiduciary duty.  However, the open-
endedness of the relationship subjects the beneficiary to the fiduciary’s 
potential opportunism.261  Vulnerability is often characterized as 
dependency: the beneficiary is dependent on the fiduciary’s discretion or 
good graces to get what they need or deserve.262  This link between 
power/discretion and vulnerability/dependency is a critical justification for 
the fiduciary relationship.263 
                                                          
257 See Marion Crain, Managing Identity: Buying into the Brand at Work, 95 IOWA L. REV. 
1179, 1184-85 (2010) (“The most effective branding programs secure a competitive 
advantage for the branded business by generating a sense of community and belonging 
that induces extraordinary effort and productivity on the job, furthers cohesion even 
among an increasingly diverse workforce, minimizes the need for surveillance and close 
supervision, and reduces employee turnover.”). 
258 Bainbridge, supra SB-PM, at 1049 (describing the conditions under which employees 
will invest in firm-specific capital).  
259 Greenfield, supra note KG-PW, at 299 (“What is important at this juncture is to notice 
that workers have some of the same problems as shareholders: they contribute something 
of value to management and they must depend on management both to maximize the 
return on that input and to share that return with them.”). 
260 See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE 
LAW 185, 190 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (“Fiduciary relationships are, 
characteristically, relationships of power and dependency.”). 
261 Smith & Lee, supra note S&L, at 620 (“Although incomplete contracts are inevitable, 
contracting parties routinely create fiduciary relationships, in which one party (the 
beneficiary) seems especially vulnerable to opportunism by the counterparty (the 
fiduciary).”). 
262 Miller, supra note PM-TFL, at 254 (“Dependence is usually taken to mean that certain 
interests of the beneficiary are subject to influence by the fiduciary.”). 
263 See id. at 620 n.54; Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular 
Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 470 (2010) (“[A]ll beneficiaries 
are vulnerable to the fiduciary's abuse of legally entrusted administrative power over 
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 Critics of employee fiduciary duties point to this factor to 
emphasize the inapplicability of such duties to employees.   The employer 
is not vulnerable to its employees, they argue; if anything employees are 
vulnerable to and dependent on their employers.264  The first claim is 
perhaps overstated: the employer is vulnerable to employee opportunism 
as a result of the discretion afforded to those employees.265  But employees 
are unquestionably vulnerable to their employers with respect to their 
livelihoods and their connection to the ongoing business enterprise.266  For 
at-will employees, their investments in their career and in the employer’s 
business can vanish in an instant.267  Employees are vulnerable to the 
employer’s control over the business enterprise to steer a greater share of 
the firm’s profits back to equity owners and away from employees.268  
Similarly, employees must place trust and confidence in their employers 
on a variety of levels to look out for their interests and manage the joint 
enterprise in which they participate; they trust that the employer (and 
those who run it) will utilize their labor with care and competence to 
                                                                                                                                                              
their legal and practical interests.”); Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal 
Authority, 31 QUEENS L.J. 259, 275 (2005)(asserting that a fiduciary obligation arises 
“whenever one party unilaterally assumes discretionary power of an administrative nature 
over the important interests of another, interests that are especially vulnerable to the 
fiduciary's discretion”)). 
264 See Fisk & Barry, supra note FB1, at 419 (“The employer owes no duty of loyalty to the 
employee and is free to pursue its self-interest by firing him to hire another for a lower 
wage or for better skills. Yet the employee's ability to pursue her own self-interest by 
seeking better opportunities is limited [under a duty of loyalty].”). 
265  See, e.g., Andrew Frazier, The Employee’s Contractual Duty of Fidelity, 131 L.Q. REV. 
53, 54 (2015) (discussing opportunities for employee opportunism). 
266 FRANK TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951) (“We have become a nation of employees. 
We are dependent upon others for our means of livelihood, and most of our people have 
become completely dependent upon wages. . . . For our generation the substance of life is in 
another man's hands.”). 
267 Greenfield, supra note KG-PW, at 302 (noting that firm-specific skills “make a worker 
more valuable to her present employer, but also make her more vulnerable to a firm's 
opportunistic behavior”). 
268 See Greg Dow & Louis Putterman, Why Capital (Usually) Hires Labor: An Assessment 
of Proposed Explanations, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 17, 37 (Margaret M. 
Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999) (“[I]t is unclear why equity investors have a greater need 
for safeguards against managerial abuse than employees.”). 
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create a successful business.269  Thus, the vulnerability factor weighs in 
favor of the employer as fiduciary. 
 Under a more specifically contractual approach to the fiduciary 
relationship, the parties’ reasonable expectations justify fiduciary duties.270  
Because contracts in certain types of relationships are substantially 
incomplete,271 there is a need for a gap-filler to manage the 
incompleteness in a flexible way.  The fiduciary duty should thus be based 
on the parties’ reasonable expectations—an off-the-rack legal form, like 
the corporation, that best suits the underlying interests of the parties 
involved.  Employees are assigned fiduciary duties under this theory 
because the employer cannot dictate every aspect of the job in the contract.  
Because the employee is charged with managing the employer’s business, 
the employer and employee would want the employee to act in the 
interests in the employer in carrying on the business.  However, the 
problem of opportunism within incomplete contracts is one that 
employees confront vis-à-vis employers as well.  Employers make myriad 
decisions that affect employees—both those that directly involve 
employees (like decisions to hire or fire) and those that indirectly but 
significantly affect employees (like the decision to start a new product 
line).  These decisions cannot be reduced to specific contractual provisions 
at the outset of the relationship.272  Given the resulting incompleteness, 
                                                          
269 Bainbridge, supra note SB-PM, at 666 (“Both the livelihood and much of the wealth of 
employees is thus dependent on the firm’s survival.”). 
270 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note EF1, at 427 (“The duty of loyalty replaces detailed 
contractual terms, and courts flesh out the duty of loyalty by prescribing the actions the 
parties themselves would have preferred if bargaining were cheap and all promises fully 
enforced.”); Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, 900 (2011) 
(“[T]he fiduciary duty is most usefully viewed as a type of contract.”). 
271 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note EF1, at 426 (“[T]he duty of loyalty is a response to the 
impossibility of writing contracts completely specifying the parties' obligations.”) 
272 Bainbridge, supra note SB-PM, at 664 (“Because employees and employers cannot 
execute a complete contract under conditions of uncertainty and complexity, many 
decisions must be left for later contractual rewrites imposed by employer fiat.”); 
Greenfield, supra note KG-PW, at 317 (“Workers and management thus face significant 
barriers to contracting, in that they face huge transaction costs in reducing to writing all 
the implicit understandings necessary to reach the outcome best for both parties.”). 
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fiduciary duties are justified to balance out the expectations of the 
parties.273    
 The economic justification for the fiduciary law of agency is the 
reduction of agency costs—the costs that a principal must incur in 
monitoring an agent.  In the simple framework of principal-agent or 
master-servant, the one-person principal/beneficiary clearly must expend 
monitoring costs on the agent/fiduciary, some of which are mitigated by 
the fiduciary duty.  However, employees also incur agency costs in making 
sure that the employer abides by its promises as to pay and benefits, 
allocates the responsibilities for the enterprise fairly, and allocates the 
returns to the business equitably.274  As to the latter, the employer may 
favor equity investors over employees,275 may favor one group of 
employees over another, or may unfairly deprive one employee of 
reasonable compensation.276 Individual employees generally have no way 
                                                          
273 Judge Easterbrook himself penned an opinion which gave potential protections to 
employees against employer opportunism that was effectuated by withholding 
confidential information.  Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (1987).  Although 
this opinion was based on the duty of good faith, it nevertheless showed the depth of the 
relationship between employer and employee, and the concern for employer 
opportunism.  Id. at 438 (“Employment creates occasions for opportunism.”). 
274 Greenfield, supra note KG-PW, at 299 (“Employees in a firm, in fact, must bear certain 
monitoring costs—‘agency costs’—associated with making sure that the firm's 
management is keeping their interests at heart.”). 
275 Id. (“What is important at this juncture is to notice that workers have some of the same 
problems as shareholders: they contribute something of value to management and they 
must depend on management both to maximize the return on that input and to share that 
return with them.”). 
276 Lilly Ledbetter provides one example of the need for monitoring costs.  Ledbetter spent 
nineteen years as a manager and executive at Goodyear Tire & Rubber and assumed that 
she was being paid a fair income. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 
621 (2007); id. at 643 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  At the end of her tenure, however, she 
discovered (through an anonymous office note) that male employees in similar positions 
were making significantly more money than she was.  Transcript at DNC Convention, at: 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics-july-dec08-ledbetter_08-26/.  By the time she 
retired, Ledbetter was paid $3,727 per month; the lowest paid male area manager received 
$4,286 per month, the highest paid, $5,236.  Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 643 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).  Ledbetter sued for sex discrimination under the Title VII.   Her lawsuit was 
originally found to be time-barred but ultimately led Congress to change the Statute of 
Limitations to allow for suits like hers.  Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
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of monitoring these decisions, other than through their own personal 
experience and what evidence they can glean from other employees.277 
Employees have no right to see each other’s pay, and social norms 
generally prevent the free spread of such information.278   
Unions address these vulnerabilities in certain respects: they can 
represent a group of employees, bargain in good faith with the employer, 
and require that the employer disclose the employees’ terms and 
conditions of employment.279  But unions can only insist on bargaining; 
they cannot provide any legal remedies for opportunism that is not 
otherwise prohibited by law.  Although often treated as a panacea in 
incomplete-contracting literature,280 labor unions fail to play the same role 
that fiduciary duties would.  Moreover, less than seven percent of private-
sector employees are represented by unions.281 
 The steady decline in unionism has had an important cost to the 
role of employees in governance.  Unions provide a vehicle for workers to 
participate in the governance of the employer.  By choosing a collective 
                                                                                                                                                              
111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).  However, Ledbetter would never have known to bring a suit if it 
were not the secret informant.   
277 Even a duty of care would be important to employees, as their human-capital 
investments in the firm will only pay off if management does not manage the business 
poorly.  Greenfield, supra note KG-PW, at 300 (“Like shareholders, workers depend on the 
care, skill and good faith of the management. If the managers do not take care, or are 
stupid, or look after themselves only, both the shareholders and the workers will be 
harmed.”). 
278 See Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Pay Secrecy/Confidentiality Rules and the 
National Labor Relations Act, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 121 (2003); Leonard Bierman & 
Rafael Gely, “Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No Way”: Workplace Social Norms and 
the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167 (2004); Matthew A. Edwards, The Law and 
Social Norms of Pay Secrecy, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 41, 62 (2005). 
279 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (duty to bargain in good faith); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 
149 (1956) (requiring an employer to provide information to union to substantiate 
bargaining claims). 
280 See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford & Armen Alchian, Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 315-16 
(1978) (describing how unions can stifle employer opportunism). 
281 Bureau of Labor Statistics, Press Release, Union Members Summary, Jan. 28, 2016, 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.  
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representative, workers can have a voice in the affairs of the workplace.282  
But workers should not be dependent on unions for such a voice; instead, 
they should be incorporated into the governance mechanisms of the firm.  
If they left outside the firm governance structure, they are vulnerable to 
the firm’s decisionmakers in ways that make them less like fidicuaries and 
more like beneficiaries.   
Part V will describe the fiduciary relationship between employees 
under two very different models.  The first model represents the current 
economic reality: employees work for an employer in which they have no 
participation in governance or ownership.  The second model represents a 
potential for the future: employees participate in governance and 
ownership along with the other equity investors in the firm.  The 
differences between these models of governance result in two very 
different paradigms for the fiduciary relationship. 
 
 
V.  EMPLOYER DUTIES AND EMPLOYER GOVERNANCE 
 
 The employment relationship is best conceived as a mutual set of 
fiduciary relationships between employer and employee.  Employees owe 
fiduciary duties of loyalty and performance to the employer, and the 
employer owes such duties to its employees.  However, the nature and 
scope of these relationships will differ depending on the nature of the 
relationship. 
 The critical factor, from a fiduciary perspective, should be whether 
employees participate in the governance of the firm/employer.  If they do 
not, as is common at most American workplaces, the employer will owe 
stronger fiduciary duties to employees in order to address the employer’s 
untrammeled discretion (vis-à-vis employees) and the potential for 
opportunism.  However, if employees do participate in the governance of 
their employer, the employer will be less akin to a remote fiduciary and 
more akin to a participatory democracy.  The firm will be the mechanism 
                                                          
282 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Promoting Employee Voice in the American Economy: A 
Call for Comprehensive Reform, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 765, 804 (2011) (“The organization of 
workers in unions was also viewed as beneficial because it would give them a greater say 
in the running of the workplace, and perhaps the country.”). 
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of coordinating joint production, through which employees and equity 
investors manage the business together.  In such a relationship, employees 
will have duties to themselves and other participants akin to the duties that 
partners owe to one another.  There is less need for fiduciary duties and 
the concomitant oversight they provide if employees are represented 
within the “firm” itself. 
 
A. Employer Fiduciary Duties Without Employee Participation in 
Governance 
 
 Employees share many of the characteristics of beneficiaries in 
fiduciary relationships: the employer exercises discretion in the 
management of the firm; employees are vulnerable to the use of that 
discretion and the potential for opportunism; and employees must incur 
agency costs in managing their relationship with the employer.283  In that 
discussion, we bracketed the idea of the “employer,” allowing the term to 
perhaps slip into the personification called to mind by “master-servant” 
doctrine.  But the employer is a firm.  It is a group of people working 
together in a joint business enterprise.  Like a partnership, it is an entity 
and an aggregate—a fictional person representing the interests of the 
collective.  Employees participate in the business of the firm—but do they 
participate in its governance? 
 In most cases, they do not.  Employees are not a meaningful 
category when it comes to corporate law.284  They are simply one category 
of the many parties who form contracts with the corporation. Although 
individual states have their own separate sets of corporate law, states 
uniformly delineate the roles of directors, officers, and shareholders in 
governing the entity. The relationships between these three groups 
constitute the purpose and function of corporate law.285  Shareholders 
                                                          
283 See Part IV.C supra. 
284 Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 85 (Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell eds., 
2012). 
285 See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 93-140 (1986) (discussing distribution of 
power between shareholders, directors, and officers). 
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select the directors at the annual shareholders meeting.286  The board 
manages the firm and may bind the corporation through contracts and 
transfers of property.287 Directors are bound to act in the interests of the 
firm through common law fiduciary duties of care, good faith, and loyalty.  
Officers are the titular heads of the corporate hierarchy, with authority to 
manage the company until the board replaces them.288  This structure—
shareholders select the directors, who select the officers, who in turn run 
the corporation—is the internal engine of corporate governance.  
Employees are not included. 
Corporations are not alone in their exclusion of employees.  An 
employee may in some cases be characterized as a partner if she is part of 
a group that meets the partnership definition: “an association of two or 
more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.”289  But 
employees-as-employees are excluded from partnership governance, which 
is controlled by partners, either as a whole or a designated sub-group.290  
Limited partnerships and LLPs are managed by general partners,291 and 
LLCs have a flexible governance structure but one that defaults to 
governance by its “members.”292  Members are designated within the LLC, 
and membership does not extend to employees as a category. 
 As the above should make clear, United States business 
organizational law has been remarkably successful in separating 
employment from ownership.293  Under our current system, employees 
                                                          
286 DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 211. 
287 Id. § 141. 
288 See CLARK, supra note RCC, at 113-23 (discussing the powers and duties of officers). 
289 R.U.P.A. § 101(6) (1994); see, e.g., Holmes v. Lerner, 74 Cal. App. 4th 442, 457-58 (1999) 
(finding that a partnership was created informally, without a governing document, when 
parties agreed to build business together and share profits). 
290 R.U.P.A. § 401(f) (1994); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & JEFFREY M. LIPSHAW, UNINCORPORATED 
BUSINESS ENTITIES 431 (4th ed. 2009) (“A hallmark of the partnership form is the co-equal 
right of every partner, absent a contrary agreement, to participate in the management of 
the enterprise.”). 
291 REV. UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 403 (1976); cf. RIBSTEIN & LIPSHAW, supra note R&L, at 529 
(noting that LLPs may prefer centralized partnership management). 
292 Id. at 432 (“Most LLC statutes provide that, in the absence of a contrary agreement, the 
LLC is managed directly by members.”). 
293 See Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate 
Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 1864 (2003) (exploring “how, in the course of the twentieth 
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hand over their labor, good will, and personal capital to the firm, but then 
the firm – established as a corporation, partnership, or LLC – directs those 
assets to the ultimate benefit of the governance participants, which are 
generally equity investors.  “Shareholder primacy” in corporate law is the 
most familiar instantiation of these mechanics.  The justification for 
shareholder primacy generally proceeds as follows: because shareholders 
are the most vulnerable, they are given control over governance rights, 
including voting rights and the ability to seek redress for violations of 
fiduciary duties.294  The end result is that all other stakeholders, including 
employees, are fenced out from participation in governance.295   
 If employees as a category are excluded from governance, they 
have no way to address the employer’s discretion, their own vulnerability 
to that discretion, and the opportunism and agency costs that are inherent 
in the relationship.  Because of this, the employer as legal entity must 
assume stronger fiduciary duties to address the imbalance.  Essentially, the 
employer would have a duty not to use its discretion to take undue 
advantage of employees, either individually or as a group.296  This duty 
would be placed on all employers, regardless of their underlying business 
organizational form.  The fiduciary duty would be an effort at boundary 
enforcement, closing off a narrow but important range of discretion that 
would otherwise be open to employers.297  In their words, the duty would 
“distinguish the appropriate pursuit of self-interest from the inappropriate 
                                                                                                                                                              
century, legal scholars and political theorists helped remove the interests of workers (as 
differentiated from shareholders, officers, and directors) from the core concerns of 
corporate law and theory”). 
294 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note EF-Book, at 67-70, 90-93. 
295 For an employee-centric attack on shareholder primacy, see Brett H. McDonnell, 
Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
FIN. 334, 335 (2008) (arguing instead for employee primacy in corporate decision-
making).  Cf. David I. Yosifon, Consumer Lock-In and the Theory of the Firm, 35 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 1429 (2012) (arguing that certain consumers have long-term and locked-in 
interests that should give them certain governance rights).  
296 Robert Bird proposed that employment contracts have an “implied covenant of the 
employment relation” that would address some of the relational opportunism concerns 
discussed here.  Bird, supra note RCB1, at 200 (“Thus, a covenant of the employment 
relation would be satisfied if the employer did not engage in relational opportunism 
towards its employees.”).   
297 Smith & Lee, supra note S&L, at 635. 
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pursuit of self-interest.”298  Here, self-interest would be the firm’s pursuit of 
its individual interests and the interests of its owners/controllers at the 
expense of employees’ interests. 
 This robust-sounding fiduciary duty may scare traditionalists, who 
might see the corporate world turned upside-down.  But this duty 
complements, rather than replaces, the rule of shareholder primacy, and 
would in fact apply to every employer, no matter the business-
organizational form.  The rule would sit within the existing common-law 
and statutory protections for employees that, in fact, treat the employer as 
something of a fiduciary already.  Many of the labor and employment 
protections discussed above in Part III are responses to employer 
opportunism.299  Minimum wages protect against employers using their 
market power to force substandard remuneration on employees—
remuneration less than what we deem to be societally acceptable for labor.  
Required benefits such as family and medical leave or health-insurance 
coverage force the employer to provide basic level of care for all 
employees.  Fiduciary responsibilities under ERISA prohibit an employer 
from underfunding a plan or succumbing to a conflict of interest.  
Employers cannot subject their employees to unsafe workplaces and must 
bear responsibility for injuries that workers suffer in the scope of 
employment.  The common law has also restrained employer discretion: 
covenants not to compete are subject to a reasonableness test, and 
terminations cannot be carried out in bad faith or in retaliation for 
protected conduct.  Perhaps the most meaningful set of quasi-fiduciary or 
governance rights are the employees’ rights to choose a bargaining 
representative and require the employer to bargain in good faith.  The 
bargaining representative can fight employer opportunism against 
employees by collecting information about employees and their terms and 
conditions of employment, forcing the employer to justify those terms and 
conditions through a process of negotiation, providing rights for 
employees to work together and even strike, if they feel they are not 
                                                          
298 Id. (emphasis in original). 
299 Cf. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225, 
273 (2013) (arguing that “employment law can be profitably understood as serving the 
interest in promoting social equality and that its rules can be analyzed, defended, and 
critiqued based on the degree to which they advance that interest”). 
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getting treated properly, and establishing a grievance-arbitration system 
for the resolution of individual employee concerns about mistreatment or 
opportunism.300  But whatever their strengths, these labor and employment 
protections do not obviate the need for a common-law fiduciary duties 
toward employees.  Instead, they provide further evidence for the concerns 
underlying such duties as well as support for a fiduciary approach. 
 So what would change?  Starting incrementally, an employer 
fiduciary duty would look similar to the existing duty of good faith, such 
that the employer could not fire an employee to prevent the accrual of a 
bonus or could not conceal business information to mislead an 
employee.301  Expanding this outward, courts could develop norms—based 
both on industry standards and social policy—about what sorts of conduct 
unfairly take advantage of employees and reek of opportunism.302  In 
addition, employers would take on a duty to act in the interests of 
employees when making decisions regarding employee interests, such as 
pension and health insurance plans.303  Pursued even more aggressively, 
employer fiduciary duties could be used to examine the structure of the 
employment relationship and compare the relative returns to employees 
and the employer.  It is conceivable that an employer using its contractual 
power to extract huge rents from its business enterprise while sharing only 
paltry amounts with employees could be subject to the duty against 
opportunistic behavior.304  Finally, perhaps the employer’s fiduciary duty 
                                                          
300 See Part III.A.6 supra. 
301 See Part IV.A supra (discussing RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 2.07, 3.05 (2015)). 
302 In their discussion of fiduciary duties, Smith and Lee place an emphasis on the role of 
social norms and industry customs in developing these duties. However, they also 
recognize that “”some industry customs and social norms may be undesirable from a 
societal standpoint.”  Smith & Lee, supra note S&L, at 638. 
303 Margaux Hall’s argument for specific fiduciary duties in the context of health 
insurance coverage provides a nice application of this principle.  Hall, supra note MH1. 
304 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. is the largest private employer in the United States.  Lesley 
Wexler, Wal-Mart Matters, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 95, 95 (2011).  It has often been cited in 
the legal and economic literature for its relatively paltry wages and benefits, as compared 
with the returns distributed to its shareholders—members of the Walton family.  See, e.g., 
id. at 97 (noting “Wal-Mart's quasi-monopsonistic hiring power [and] its vigorous union-
busting efforts”); Benedict Sheehy, Corporations and Social Costs: The Wal-Mart Case 
Study, 24 J.L. & COM. 1, 40 (2004) (“Wal-Mart's low wage policy drives down prices in the 
labour market. It off loads its operating costs onto the state and other businesses. It 
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could include a prohibition against subcontracting, restructuring, or other 
forms of workplace “fissuring” in which employees are cut loose from the 
firm and cut out of their share of the pie.305 
 It may seem objectionable to saddle the employer with such a 
significant and potentially ambiguous responsibility for the interests of its 
employees, who (under current law) are deemed contractual partners 
looking after themselves.  But this contractual model of the employment 
relationship is outdated, and it is blind to the many common-law and 
statutory responsibilities that society has already loaded upon employers, 
starting with the original doctrine of respondeat superior.  We may also 
object to the paternalistic way in which we expect the business to look out 
for the interests of its workers—a “nanny employer,” as it were.306  There is 
a way out of this paradigm—a way in which employees depend less on the 
employer as a separate entity and take more responsibilities upon 
themselves.  But this would require giving employees meaningful 
governance rights within the employer itself. 
 
B. Employer Fiduciary Duties under a Participatory Governance Model 
 
 If employees participate in the governance of the employer, the 
fiduciary relationship changes.  No longer are workers simply subject to 
                                                                                                                                                              
damages the well-being of employees by eliminating opportunity to access psychic 
income generating activities, and increasing stress resulting from employee turn-over.”); 
Carol Zabin et al., The Hidden Public Costs of Low-Wage Jobs in California, The National 
Economic Development and Law Center, at 23-25 (May 2004) 
http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/pdf/2004/workingpoor.pdf; Edward B. Shils, Measuring the 
Economic and Sociological Impact of the Mega-Retail Discount Chains on Small 
Enterprise in Urban, Suburban and Rural Communities, SHILS REP., Feb. 7, 1997.  But see 
Richard A. Epstein, On Wal-Mart: Doing Good by Doing Nothing, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1287, 
1304 (2007) (“Wal-Mart is the source of opportunity. Its opponents block opportunities. 
They do not create them.”). 
 For a discussion of a company that allegedly broke its relational promises to 
employees, see Judy Pate & Charles Malone, Post-“Psychological Contract” Violation: The 
Durability and Transferability of Employee Perceptions: The Case of TimTec, 24 J. EUR. 
INDUS. TRAINING 158 (2000). 
305 For a discussion of new ways in which employees are sliced, diced, and minced out of 
the modern firm, see DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE (2014). 
306 M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1517 (2009). 
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the whims of a separate entity that controls the underlying business 
enterprise.  Instead, they have a voice in the decisionmaking mechanisms 
of that enterprise.  They have a role to play in the employer’s exercise of its 
discretion.  They are no longer as vulnerable to opportunism.  Their 
vulnerability is that of one set of participants to another, rather than of a 
powerless beneficiary and a powerful fiduciary.  It becomes less a question 
of fiduciary responsibility and more one of appropriately structured 
governance rights.  Instead, it is about the use of fiduciary duties to 
manage the discretion and vulnerabilities within the employment 
relationship.  And such duties could be changed—diminished—if 
employees had participatory rights in firm governance.307 
 As participants in the firm, employees would no longer be able to 
view the “employer” as simply an us-against-them relationship.  Instead, 
the employer would consist of the employees as well as the equity 
investors. As such, employees would have duties to each other and to the 
other participants through their own fiduciary duties to the employer.  
This approach provides a much stronger foundation for the traditional 
employee fiduciary duties to the firm.  The employees as a group are 
committing to refrain from opportunism that would harm their fellow 
employees.  An employee would not be harming a nameless, faceless 
“employer” by stealing business opportunities or disclosing confidential 
information.  Instead, the employee would be harming the ongoing 
business enterprise, represented by the firm, in which his fellow employees 
were still participating.  So instead of being tribute paid to a master, the 
duty of loyalty is a pact amongst equals not to engage in opportunism.  
Similarly, intellectual property doctrines that seem to harm employees, 
like the shop-right doctrine308 or the work-for hire doctrine,309 could be 
                                                          
307 An extensive discussion of employee participation in management is beyond the scope 
of this paper.  However, such an approach would be more consonant with employees’ 
participatory role within the firm.  See Bodie, supra note MTB-EBF, at 100, 102.  For an 
argument that participatory management may be an adaptive market response but 
should not be made mandatory, see Bainbridge, supra note SB-PM, at 658.  For arguments 
in favor of worker participation, see Greenfield, supra note KG-PW.  For an argument that 
employee participation in governance only works when workers are homogenous, see 
HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 91-98 (1996). 
308 CATHERINE L. FISK, WORKING KNOWLEDGE: EMPLOYEE INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF 
CORPORATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1800-1930 118 (2009).   
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seen instead as agreements amongst employees to share the fruits of their 
common labors with the collective, rather than jumping ship 
opportunistically. 
 Because the fiduciary relationship would be with one’s co-venturers 
in the economic enterprise, the relationship would more closely resemble 
those business relationships with default rules of equal participation, such 
as partnerships.  Partners owe fiduciary duties to the partnership as a 
separate entity as well as to their fellow partners in the aggregate.310  
Employees would have similar duties within the context of the 
employer.311  If employees do have governance rights, individual and 
smaller groups of employees would still need protection against 
opportunities by the voting majority to behave opportunistically and 
deprive the minority of its fair share.  But such duties would resemble the 
shareholder “minority oppression” doctrine, rather than an agent’s 
fiduciary duties.312  Under this doctrine, courts have equitable power to 
                                                                                                                                                              
309 Id.   
310 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, 2 BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 
6.07(a) (2004); Smith, supra note GSCRT, at 1458.  Modern partnership law is engaged in 
an ongoing debate as to whether a partnership is simply a collective of individuals 
(aggregate theory) or is an entity unto itself (entity theory).  This divergence reflects a 
similar tension in the role of employees who participate in the firm’s governance. 
311 Larry Ribstein has argued that in fact, partners should not all have fiduciary 
responsibilities to each other; only those who have open-ended managerial discretion 
should owe fiduciary duties.  Ribstein, supra not LRAPF, at 215.  According to Ribstein, 
governance rights are not themselves sufficient to create fiduciary duties; there must be 
some discretionary, managerial power over other owners to justify the imposition of such 
duties.  Id. at 237-40.   The duties that partners would owe to each other under Ribstein’s 
approach follow the duties that co-owners—co-participants in governance—owe to each 
other.  In fact, he raised concerns about the denigration of governance rights if fiduciary 
duties were also imposed on top of the governance rights. Id. at 233. Ribstein’s approach 
to nonmanaging partners would have similar resonance as to employees with governance 
rights.  On the other hand, employees with managerial discretion would owe fiduciary 
duties, given the entrustment of the firm in their hands.  See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary 
Law in the Twenty-First Century, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1289, 1293 (2011) (discussing the concept 
of entrustment). 
312 Minority shareholder oppression occurs when the majority group in a closely-held 
corporation uses its power over the corporation to deprive minority shareholders of 
certain fruits or expected returns from the business.  Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder 
Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. 
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adjust decisions made by controlling shareholders (or shareholder blocs) 
that unfairly target minority shareholders and deprive them of their 
proportional shareholder value.313  Minority oppression includes not only 
conduct such as unfair buybacks or dividend distributions, but also 
disproportionate employment salaries for majority owners or decisions to 
terminate the employment of minority shareholders.314  It is a holistic 
doctrine that tries to root out decisions that violate the boundaries of 
fairness and the reasonable expectations of the parties.315  A similar 
doctrine could apply to employees to make sure a majority bloc within the 
employer did not use its power to disadvantage a minority bloc of 
employees unfairly.316 
                                                                                                                                                              
REV. 749, 750 (2000) (“The doctrine of shareholder oppression protects the close 
corporation minority stockholder from the improper exercise of majority control.”).  For 
example, majority shareholders may terminate a minority shareholder’s employment by 
the company, depriving that shareholder of the expectations of a continued salary.  See, 
e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Mass. 1976) 
(describing one type of shareholder oppression as “to deprive minority stockholders of 
corporate offices and of employment with the corporation”). Some courts have 
characterized the minority oppression doctrine in the language of fiduciary duty.  
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975) 
(“Because of the fundamental resemblance of the close corporation to the partnership, the 
trust and confidence which are essential to this scale and manner of enterprise, and the 
inherent danger to minority interests in the close corporation, we hold that stockholders 
in the close corporation owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the 
operation of the enterprise that partners owe to one another.”). 
313 See Moll, supra note DM-Vand, at 759-61 (describing oppression doctrine and the 
avenues of relief available to courts). 
314 See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression v. Employment At Will in the Close 
Corporation: The Investment Model Solution, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 517, 520 (1999) 
(discussing the conflict between employment at-will and shareholder oppression doctrine 
when at-will shareholders are terminated). 
315 Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1161, 1199 (2010) (“In a growing number of jurisdictions, courts 
evaluate claims of oppression by asking whether the majority has deprived the minority 
of the objectively reasonable expectations that motivated its investment.”). 
316 As with the minority oppression doctrine, the courts would need to walk a fine line 
between the rights of the minority to minimum standards and the rights of the majority 
to manage the business enterprise as it saw fit.  Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based 
Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority Shareholder Oppression in the Close 
Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1207, 1211 (2009) (“Rather than insisting upon strained 
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 If employees participate in governance, the employer would not 
have a duty not to use its discretion to take undue advantage of employees, 
either individually or as a group.  Instead, the governing group as a whole 
would need to agree not to unfairly target minority interests within the 
firm.  These democratically-structured rights and duties would better align 
the employee’s interests with the interests of the firm itself.  As such, there 
would be much less of a need for fiduciary protection.  For those looking 
to free the workplace of many of the employment and labor law 
regulatory encumbrances,317 employee governance participation provides a 





 Employee fiduciary duties sit uneasily within agency doctrine: they 
are clearly required by traditional doctrine, but their justifications have 
become harder to defend.  However, when seen within a more holistic 
approach to the employment relationship, these duties are justified as a set 
of protections for one’s fellow employees and the other participants in the 
firm.  If allowed to participate in firm governance, employees would 
rightfully have duties against opportunism, and employers would simply 
be fictional placeholders for the aggregate governance mechanisms they 
would represent.  On the other hand, if employers continue to fence 
employees out of governance, stronger fiduciary responsibilities are 
required to prevent employer opportunism.  Either approach would be 
superior to our current law, under which vulnerable employees owe ill-
defined fiduciary duties and employers have no reciprocal obligations. 
                                                                                                                                                              
comparisons to public corporation or partnership models of governance, courts should 
minimize deterrents to minority investment by preventing majority shareholders from 
taking unfair advantage of their power while also recognizing the majority shareholders' 
right to benefit from control in order to encourage their investment.”).  This is the work 
that a vague word like “unfair” must take on within the doctrine. 
317 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Contractual Solutions for Employment Law Problems, 38 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 789, 802 (2015) (“The best response today to labor market 
regulation comes straight from Moses: ‘Let my people go.’”); cf. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The 
Law of Termination: Doing More with Less, 68 MD. L. REV. 89, 91 (2008) (arguing for 
simplification of employment law through a uniform unjust dismissal law). 
